EU as a Global Security Actor - Hopes and Expectations by Schultz-Lorentzen, Johannes et al.
 
 
 
 
Standard Front Page for Projects and Master Theses 
 
Compulsory use for all projects and Master Theses on the following subjects: 
  
 International Develoment Studies 
 Global Studies 
 Erasmus Mundus, Global Studies – A European Perspective 
 Public Administration 
 Social Science 
 EU-studies 
 Public Administration, MPA 
 
User’s manual on the next page. 
 
Project title:  
 
EU as a Global Security Actor – Hopes and Expectations 
Project seminar 
 
 
Prepared by (Name(s) and study number): Kind of project: Module: 
Gent Grinvalds Harbro - 47102 Project EU-B1 
Lars Asbjørn Holst - 47035 Project EU-B1 
Johannes Søndergaard Schultz-Lorentsen - 47469 Bachelor Project EU-B1 
David Sørensen – 47240 Project EU-B1 
Tobias Kjer Welander – 47272 Project EU-B1 
   
Name of Supervisor:  
 
AnneMarie Peen Rodt 
Submission date:  
 
18-12-2013 
Number of keystrokes incl. spaces (Please look at the next page): 
209.690 
Permitted number of keystrokes incl. spaces cf. Supplementary Provisions (Please look at 
the next page): 
 
180.000-240.000 
 
 
OBS! 
If you exceed the permitted number of keystrokes incl. spaces your project will be rejected 
by the supervisor and/or the external examiner until 1 week after the submission. 
  
 
 
Roskilde University 
EU-studies 
Supervisor: 
Annemarie Peen Rodt 
Project Group: Lars Asbjørn 
Holst, 
Gent Grinvalds Harbro 
Johannes S. Schultz-
Lorentzen 
David Sørensen, Tobias Kjer Welander 
2013 
 
The EU as a Global Security 
Actor 
Hopes and Expectations 
1 
 
Abstract 
In 1993, Professor Christopher Hill defined a gap between the expectations to the Euro-
pean Union’s security policy and its actual capabilities, the so-called capability-
expectation gap. This project investigates whether the European Union still suffers from a 
capability-expectation gap, following the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty, and if the con-
temporary expectations towards the Union, as a foreign security actor, are justified.  
The project has its starting point in Hill’s theoretical framework, which consist of the 
three different components defining the capability-expectation gap; EU’s operational ca-
pacity, its resources and its ability to agree. These three points, together with the internal 
and external expectations post-Lisbon, are analysed based upon the outlined changes in 
the institutional framework of the CFSP, following the implementation of the Lisbon 
Treaty. To fully grasp this development, the theory of New Institutionalism is used. The 
analysis uncovers two contemporary gaps; the Member States ability to agree and the 
High Representative’s ability to make them agree, and their actual capabilities of doing 
so. These gaps serve as the base when analysing the case of the Mali crisis. The Mali cri-
sis, with its security implications for the EU, is used to further explore the existence of 
the gaps. It also provides an understanding of which expectations the Member States have 
to EU as a military actor. These expectations, together with the theory of Normative 
Power, give an understanding of whether the contemporary expectations are justified.  
The project concludes that the EU suffers from a capability-expectation gap, and that the 
contemporary expectations are unjustified. The increased expectations were a conse-
quence of a time, where Germany, France and the UK had a rare consensus on the Unions 
future military capabilities, which manifested itself in a greater operational capacity of 
the CFSP. In an intergovernmental system, where a decision reflects the consensus of the 
Member States, the expectations became unjustifiably high, when the political willing-
ness changed and the expectations, to the ability to act united, remained.  
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List of abbreviations 
The Big Three: Germany, UK and France. 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP): The agreed upon foreign policy of the 
EU, pertaining primarily to security, defence diplomacy and actions based upon these. 
European External Action Service (EEAS): The EU's diplomatic corps. It is a service 
designed to support the HR in conducting the CFSP. It is an autonomously functioning 
organ within the EU, but must make sure any policies created are within the legal 
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boundary imposed by the EU.  
Directorate General (DG): A Department inside the Commision.  
Hard power: The use of military measures, and/or aggressive economic sanctions or 
similar disruptive economic means. 
Global security actor: Global Security Actor is in this project defined as an actor, who is 
able to use military force, in foreign security matters. 
High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs (HR): A prominent position 
within the EU, with roles such as conducting the EU's common foreign and security 
policy, representing the EU in matters relating to foreign and security policy, conducting 
political dialogue with third parties on the EU's behalf. The HR also exercises authority 
over the EEAS. The position is currently held by HR Ashton. 
Member State (MS): Refers to either one or all of the 28 countries included in the EU 
cooperation, depending on the context.   
Post-Lisbon: Means after the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty the 1st of December 
2009. 
Sanctions: Introducing trade restrictions upon a nation, be it weapons embargoes, trade 
of a certain product or a complete cut-off from all trade. Used within the EU as a measure 
designed to hit the economy of affected country, by effectively uniting the countries in 
EU in a common economic cut-off of the affected country. Sanctions are used in order to 
trump a political agenda through, if the country depends on trade with a union MS, odds 
are, that a economic cut-off from said MS will hurt the country's economy greatly and 
thus force the country to act or negotiate with the EU. 
The Copenhagen Criteria are the criteria’s countries that wish to join the EU have to 
fulfil, before they are considered. These criteria include:  
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- “political criteria: stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of 
law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities; 
- economic criteria: a functioning market economy and the capacity to cope with 
competition and market forces; 
- administrative and institutional capacity to effectively implement the acquis (All 
EU-legislation) and ability to take on the obligations of membership.” (European 
Commission, 2012) 
The Copenhagen Criteria are named after the city, where the European Council defined 
them in 1993. 
The Lisbon Treaty (LT): This was a treaty designed to form a constitutional basis for the 
EU, it was signed by the MS in 2007, and implemented in 2009. Part of the treaty 
involved the creation of the EEAS. 
Operational capacity: This refers to the EU's ability to act united and their ability to take 
either military action, or their ability to impose sanctions. This in terms of how well the 
EU as a supranational organ, is capable of dictating the EU's common actions, in terms of 
military intervention or sanctions.  
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Introduction 
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1.1 Introduction 
When the Lisbon Treaty (LT) was ratified in 2007 and entered into force a year later, it 
was a big step towards a more connected and united European Union (EU), and one of 
the biggest steps forward in European integration since the common currency zone of the 
European Monetary Union (EMU) was implemented. The treaty sought to, among other 
things; streamline the decision-making process through the introduction of Qualified Ma-
jority Voting (QMV) in the Council, and to legitimize the EU in relation to the Member 
States (MS) populations, by giving the Parliament the right to participate in the policy-
making on more areas. In regards to its foreign policy, many new important aspects were 
implemented. Of these, the most important was the introduction of the European External 
Action Service (EEAS) and the new position of High Representative of the Union for 
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR). These two were intended to represent the EU 
in foreign affairs, with the HR having the power to sign legislation or agreements with 
foreign countries on behalf of the whole EU, rather than making bilateral agreements be-
tween individual MS and foreign countries.  
Even though that these initiatives are new to the institutional framework of the EU, and it 
remains unclear, among scholars and politicians, exactly what the EEAS’s and the HR’s 
role are, one thing is certain. One of the purposes of the Lisbon Treaty was to introduce 
initiatves that would support a more coherent system to make it easier to reach common 
agreements, and respond faster to crises. This was to ensure that the indesiveness and 
shortcomings of previous conflicts, was not to be repeated. A viewpoint often expressed 
among scholars and politicians, when discussing the EU compared to similar global pow-
ers, is that the MS are too divided. This hinders the EU’s ability to act swiftly and effi-
ciently in foreign matters, compared to global actors such as USA and China. Critics ar-
gue that the EU, because it lacks cooperation and coordination between MS in regards to 
foreign affairs, and it being difficult for the EU to practice hard power, cannot be an im-
portant actor in solving international problems. 
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Supporters of the EU however, will often say that EU’s role in the global community is 
not to act internationally through hard power, but instead act through soft and normative 
power supported by EU’s role as one of the largest economies and the largest single mar-
ket in the world (Europa.eu, 2013).  
Regardless of how the EU uses its abilities or how they should be used; the discussion 
raises important questions about EU’s role and place in the global community. Even 
among MS there does not seem to be an exact answer, but the founding of the EEAS 
seem to suggest, that the EU intends to act more as a unit, in regard to foreign issues, in 
the future. 
The EU’s neighbourhood policy is one of its most active foreign policy instruments. De-
veloping countries close to the EU are the primary recipients of support, mostly financial-
ly through e.g. trade agreements, to develop their economic and social structure if they at 
the same time commit themselves to, among other things, government, human rights re-
forms and democracy-building (EEAS, 2013h). This neighbourhood policy has the dual 
goals of stabilizing the EU’s “neighbourhood”, and makes the recipients better suited as 
trading partners by building their economy and infrastructure. It also serves to create or 
expand friendly relations with nearby states. 
However, it is not always that simple, as seen during the ‘Arab spring’, which started in 
2010, where hostilities and mass protests broke out in several of the countries associated 
with the neighbourhood policy program, such as Egypt, Tunisia and Libya. The govern-
ments in those countries, who were supported by, or at least collaborated with the EU, 
were overthrown - in the case of Libya, through a civil war. As an EU-official stated the 
‘Arab Spring’ illuminated inconsistencies of the EU foreign policies:  
“The Arab Spring has also been a wake-up call for us as it showed that in spite of that 
tangible success inside the EU we have not always been as coherent and consistent in our 
foreign relations” (Toornstra, 2013) 
These inconsistencies were also apparent in the crisis in Mali, where an already unstable 
situation, deteriorated to the point where there was a risk of Mali becoming a failed state. 
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To prevent this, an UN mandated force lead by France intervened, despite some calls for 
an EU-lead intervention. The EU was much criticized for not being able to agree that an 
intervention was necessary, at least not in time.  
However, as early as during the Yugoslav wars in the 1990’s the EU proved incapable of 
taking rapid action or any relevant action at all, to put an end to the violence. Even 
though it took place right in the EU’s backyard (Hill, 1993:315). This failure to act, along 
with the unstable situation in Eastern Europe after the collapse of The Soviet Union, led 
to the creation and consolidation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) 
under the Maastricht Treaty (Ibid). The CFSP brought for the first time a military-defence 
component into the institutional framework, as the 2nd pillar of EU. The introduction of 
CFSP was for many, both internal and external actors, perceived as the EU improving the 
capabilities available for taking rapid action and making common defence decisions, and 
the expectations for the EU’s role as a global actor was consequently heightened.  
However, in 2003 the EU disappointed again, as the MS during the Iraqi War once more 
proved incapable of deciding a common course of action, as the UK with support from 
MS like Denmark partook as an integral part of the US-led coalition force, while Germa-
ny and France condemned this course of action. 
These repeated failures of the EU to live up to the expectations represents a severe prob-
lem, not only for the self-serving interests of the Union and the MS, who would gain 
from a more cohesive strategy, but also since such an inability to live up to the expecta-
tions can create a volatile foreign policy. Such an inconsistency in a foreign policy actor 
can be dangerous to the entire international community since its actions can be difficult to 
predict. 
The implementation of the LT, and the subsequent change of the institutional framework 
in the CFSP, were supposed to correct this problem, and co-opt a coherent foreign and 
security policy for the Union to follow. This proably increased the expectations once 
again. However, as could be observed during the Arab Spring, it could seem like the EU 
did not live up to these expectations. This apparent gap between expectations and capa-
16 
 
bilities, and the subsequent problems it raises, leads to this project's problem formulation, 
which is: 
 
1.2 Problem Formulation 
Does the EU suffer from a capability-expectation gap, and is the contemporary expecta-
tions towards the EU as a global security actor justified? 
 
In order to answer the problem formulation, there have been created the sub-questions 
underneath. 
1.3 Sub-questions 
I – What are the EU’s foreign and security competences following the Lisbon Treaty? 
II – What kind of capability-expectations gap exists in the EU following the 
implementations of the Lisbon Treaty? 
III – Does this new capability-expectations gap show in the EU’s handling of the Mali 
Crisis?  
IV - Is this expectations gap a result of either too high expectations, or too low 
capabilities, and how can it be closed? 
V – Are the expectations gap justifiable when seen in a Normative Power view? 
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In a project with such a wide scope as this, it is important to limit the scope of the re-
search, in order to answer the problem in a concise and satisfying way. The purpose of 
this section is to explain which aspects the project delimits itself from. 
The main purpose of the project is to investigate the role of the EU in foreign and securi-
ty matters. This is done by uncovering the expectation-capability gap post-Lisbon, and 
understanding how this gap is evident in the EU’s handling of the Mali crisis in accord-
ance with its strategy for the Sahel region. The Mali crisis has been chosen, as it seeming-
ly illuminates different aspects and implications of the EU’s foreign policy ability. The 
Mali case is newer and therefore more relevant when understanding the CFSP, than for 
instance The Balkan Wars, Iraq or Afghanistan, as the LT had not been implemented dur-
ing these conflicts. Other possible primary cases could have been the civil war in Libya 
and in Syria, or the sanctions against Iran. Libya and Iran are however used as examples 
throughout the analyses. Syria has not been chosen, since the conflict is ongoing and a 
possible military intervention has yet to manifest itself.  
The Mali conflict will only be discussed and analysed in broad strokes. This is because 
the main focus of this project is to investigate how EU handles crises like this and expose 
the different expectations of the institutions and MS, together with the actual capabilities 
of EU in conflicts like the ones mentioned. 
1.5 Reading guide 
In this section, an introduction to each chapter will be given, and the important parts will 
be highlighted and their relevance explained.  
The project consist of elleven chapters; 1st - the introduction, 2nd - the methodological, 
empirical, 3rd -  the theoretical approach, 4-8th - the analyses, 9th – the conclusion, 10th 
– reflection and 11th – call for research. 
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1.4 Delimitation 
The introduction chapter introduces the overall topic of the project, the problem 
formulation and the sub-questions. The methodological and theoretical chapters show the 
scientific approaches, the theories and the methodology used to gather the empirical 
evidence. The working questions are converted into analysis I, II, III and IV, which 
follows the inductive approach of methodology, where analysis (I) is used to identify the 
formal competences of the relevant institutions regarding the EU’s foreign and security 
policy, to find out what has changed since the implementation of Lisbon treaty. Analysis 
(II) is then used to find the expectations gap, by first finding the internal and external 
expectations to the EU’s security policy. Secondly by finding the actual capabilities, and 
comparing those to identify the gap. The identified gap will be used in Analysis (III) on 
the case of Mali to find out if the capabilities-expectations gap show in the handling of 
the Mali crisis. Analysis (IV) is used to discuss and further analyse the findings of the 
first three analyses to find out if the expectations to the EU are justified or not.  
The findings from analyses (I), (II), (III) and (IV) are used in a discussion set in a 
‘normative power theory’ perspective, about the expectations and the contrast between 
the use of hard power and normative power by the EU.  
All the analyses will be combined in a final conclusion where the problem formulation 
will be answered, after that there will be a reflection on the project, where a discussion 
about the overall scientific validity of the project will be done. Lastly there will be a call 
for future research on important aspects of the project, which would be beneficial to 
further research in other projects.  
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1.6 Project design 
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CHAPTER 2 
The Methodological 
and the Empirical 
Approach  
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2.1 The Methodological and the empirical approach 
This chapter describes how the project’ approach the problem issues and how this is 
processed in a methodological context.  This will form the foundation for the scientific 
arguments in the project, by explaining the motives behind the choices in relations to the 
methodological considerations. The project’ has sought to be critical of all sources and 
has tried to increase the validity of the project. It also contains a discussion of strengths 
and weaknesses of the different methods and sources. 
The project uses the inductive method approach, by extrapolating general knowledge, 
through analysis of specific data, which in this project consist of the chosen empirical 
material, and is analysed within the framework of the theories, especially the 
expectations/capabilities gap theory. The purpose for analysing the EU’s policy, and the 
expectations expressed in regards to the case, is to answer the problem formulation and 
thereby say something general about the EU’s security and defence policy. In essence this 
project outlines general patterns in the EU foreign and security policies, and these 
patterns are understood in context to the problem formulation. This approach also means 
that the project will mostly rely on qualitative data for the research. As this is one of the 
characteristics of the inductive approach (Boolsen, 2010:207f)  
2.2 Qualitative interviews, Document analysis and Policy analysis 
2.2.1 Interview structure 
In this project a qualitative interview with an expert, with academic expertise in EU and 
its foreign and security policy, is used to heighten the scientific discussion. This is 
prepared with the semi-structured interview approach, where predetermined questions, 
are the focus of the interview (Bryman 2012:470ff).  During the interview it is taken into 
account that the interviewee can bring new knowledge to the subject, which can lead to 
new unprepared questions.  These questions are used to elaborate on the expert’s 
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knowledge. This method gives an overall guide for the interview, but is open to new 
perspectives and questions raised in the interview (Bryman 2012:470). Using an expert 
with knowledge in the field of European Studies can give a deeper understanding of the 
field and enhance the scientifically validity of the project. The important parts of the 
interview will be used in the project in order to further strengthen points and give a 
deeper knowledge of the subject. 
2.2.2 Ian Manners 
Professor Ian Manners was chosen because he can give a deeper understanding of the 
problem area and is the author of the theory of Normative Power. He is therefore 
qualified to provide relevant and up-to-date information of the EU in context to his 
theory, since he is the primary source. He has researched in the field of the EU, its 
integration process and its foreign and security policy throughout most of his scientific 
career, and therefore has a great knowledge on the subject. He is currently employed at 
Copenhagen University as a professor in Political Science with focus on European 
integration. He is a prominent actor in scientific discussions about European foreign 
policies and has been published in several scientific journals (KU, 2013). This should 
help to give a more nuanced picture of the process in EU. But because he is not part of 
the political system, he mostly has a research based insight. He is not in direct contact 
with the system, and subsequently observes the problems from an outside perspective. 
Because of this he may have knowledge gaps about the real power balance between the 
institutions.  
2.2.3 Papers 
To heighten the insight into the inner workings of the EEAS and the power balance be-
tween the institutions, interviews of different officials have been sought, but because they 
have been unavailable, several papers have been used as a substitute. These papers come 
from a variety of expert and academics, several papers comes for instance from accredit-
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ed sources, such as the European Policy Centre (EPC), International Security Information 
Service (ISIS) and Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS). As an example “The New 
EU Foreign Policy Architecture – reviewing the first two years of the EEAS” is a paper 
by CEPS, where different EU-officials have been interviewed about the workings of the 
EEAS for a review of the first two years. These extracts have been dealt with objectively 
in the thesis in order to give more quality to arguments. It would have been preferred to 
interview these officials first hand as the primary source, but as it has not been possible, 
this paper is used as a secondary source, and is a good supplement to support arguments 
throughout the thesis.  
in the project in order to give more quality to arguments. It would have been preferred to 
interview these officials first hand as the primary source, but as it has not been possible, 
this paper, is used as a secondary source, and is a good supplement to support arguments 
throughout the project. 
2.2.4 Documents and policy analysis 
There will also in the project be used a documents and policy analytical approach, which 
is used to give a more thorough insight into the competences and the intentions of the 
institutions. In addition the official documents should give an understanding of the 
different policy processes in the EU (Lynggaard, 2010:137ff). EU documents like the LT, 
Directive (2010/427/EU) and the EU Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel, 
are all part of the foundation of this project. They are part of the research field, and 
through them, it is possible to understand the official competences of the institutions. A 
qualitative content analysis is used to find the important themes and wordings by coding, 
analysis and interpretations of these documents (Bryman 2012:557ff).  Furthermore there 
is an analysis of the policies which have been relevant to the Mali case. This is done to 
get a deeper understanding of the different actors, and how they engage and interact in 
the institutions. This is to give an insight into the negotiations which are the foundation 
upon which the decisions in the EU are made.  
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2.2.5 Public announcements, reports, speeches, and journals 
The project makes use of several public announcements from the EEAS, the European 
Council, the Commission, the Council, the Parliament, Member States and statements 
from the HR Catherine Ashton (HR Ashton). They each represent official positions, and 
are important to the project due to the insight they offer into these actors different 
intentions. However, it is important to remember that these are often of a political nature, 
and are made with a diplomatic strategy in mind and/or image management. They will 
however be interpreted as official positions. 
2.2.5 Internet sources and media 
The internet articles and media used in this project are from respected Danish and foreign 
media sources. The purpose of using these media-platforms has been to obtain general 
data and specific statements from politicians. The intention of using these has therefore 
not been to get the specific media’s point of view. Articles have also been used to find 
assessments from other experts in the field of EU, but they are only used to support main 
arguments and relevant discussions in the analysis and will not be used as main 
arguments themselves. These expert opinions are of a normative nature, but as long as 
they do not become the main arguments, and they are viewed through a critical lens, they 
are still valid as a source of empirical evidence 
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CHAPTER 3 
Theories 
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3.1 Theories used in the project  
In the following the theories and arguments for their relevance are presented, and fully 
explained. 
In order to understand the EU in regards to its foreign and security policies, and give the 
project a theoretical scientific aspect, different theories have been used. Since the foreign 
and security area is a consequence of an interaction between the European institutions 
and the MS, it is important to find theories that can help explain this internal conflict. 
As described the EU’s ability to assert themselves as a global security actor has been 
criticized by a lot of scholars and politicians. To understand the context in which this 
criticism has arisen and the reason for this, the theory of the capability-expectations gap 
by Christopher Hill is used. This theory is used as the main theory, as it provides a 
framework for understanding why there is a miss-match between the expectations and 
actual capabilities that leads to this sort criticism. This is both used to understand if the 
official EU’s agenda matches its capabilities, and if the gap has narrowed or closed since 
Hill wrote his theory. The theory will therefore play an important role in the overall 
analysis. 
The theory of New Institutionalism is used to understand who has the authority of EEAS 
and in EU in regards to foreign and security policies. The LT and Directive 
(2010/427/EU) are used here to understand the conferral of power since Lisbon and used 
to understand the balance of power. This makes the theory relevant as it further elaborates 
on the capabilities and expectations. 
To properly understand what kind of “power” the EU is wielding as an actor on the 
international stage, Normative Power by Ian Manners will be used to put the analysis into 
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perspective, to understand if the general expectations to the EU are wrong. 
 
3.2 The Capability- Expectations Gap 
In 1993 Christopher Hill of London School of Economics tried to put European Foreign 
Policy into perspective, in an article titled “The Capability-Expectations Gap, or 
Conceptualizing Europe’s International Role”. The term Capability-Expectations Gap, 
which describes the gap between what the EU has been talked up to do and what it 
actually has the capability to do, has since been a well-integrated and accepted term when 
studying the EU (Hill, 1993:306). 
In the article Hill describes the, at the time, recent difficulties with defining the EU’s 
foreign policy through established theoretical criteria of international relations, since the 
EU itself is difficult to define, even just as an actor. Therefore, instead of theorizing how 
and why the EU acts, he tried to explain exactly why it is so hard to define the role of the 
EU in the international system. His main point was that the EU was exposed to an 
unrealistic internal and external expectation of the capability of its foreign policy. This 
mismatch, which gives external actors the impression of the EU as weak, can only be 
closed by either lowering the expectations or improving the capabilities. The capability-
expectation gap is dangerous as it creates false possibilities, diminish the credibility of 
the EU and at worse induce a polarization between the MS.  
3.2.1 Expectations 
Hill argued in 1993 that the EU has come to a point where it is not capable of fulfilling 
the new expectations in regards to foreign policy matters, which stems from the Single 
Market creation and the general euphoric optimistic mood after the fall of the USSR 
(Hill, 1993:315). Hill points out, that the expectations from both internal and external 
actors are substantial. The external demands in 1993 was nothing less than the securing of 
stability and democracy for Eastern Europe, a solution for the Yugoslavian crisis and 
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relief for Third World poverty(Hill, 1993:315). The US’s attention and willingness to 
secure European interests and its borders became less prominent with the fall of the Iron 
Curtain. They expected the EU to be able to handle its own “backyard”, where solving 
the Yugoslavian crisis would be an obvious European task.  
The creation of the Single Market and the aspiring hope of a united and free Europe, gave 
rise to expectations and demands from both the Commission and some MS; 
 
“The Community does not have the resources or the political structure to be able to 
respond to the demands which the Commission and certain Member States have virtually 
invited through their bullishness over the pace of internal change”( Hill, 1993:315).  
 
These expectations and demands were unrealistically high, as the EU foreign policy 
capacity had developed at a slower rate. 
 
3.2.2 Capability 
The term “capability” covers the ability to agree, the internal resources and operational 
capacity (Hill, 1993:315). If the European foreign policy was to live up to the 
expectations at that time, it should have been capable of making clear decisions on high 
policy matters, commanding the resources and instruments to back them up, and have a 
sophisticated bureaucracy at its disposal (Hill, 1993:316).  
When the paper was written in 1993, the Member States had just accepted the Maastricht 
Treaty, and the Union was in many regards in a great development. But the progress of 
the foreign and security area had been much slower, a slow step by step approach without 
a great reform of governance and capability. The Common Foreign and Security Policy 
(CFSP) was indeed created with the Maastricht Treaty, but had more in its wording than 
its functions (Hill, 1993:325).  
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The operational capacity is the means to perform operations in security and defence area. 
This is defined as the coordination measures, strategies, equipment and institutions that 
makes the operational capacity function (Hill, 1993:320).  
The internal resources is defined as primarily the military spending and means to address 
the coordination of military needs(Hill, 1993: 320f) 
The ability to agree is defined as the MS ability to make a consensus and stick to it(Hill, 
1993:316). This is a main obstacle in the effectiveness of the EU. It does not act as a 
unity, simply because it in many regards is not. It does not have the needed coherent 
system to act efficient or united, and in some regards it cannot be defined as an 
international actor, especially on matters of defence. Mutual obligations in the sense of 
accepting a formal defence alliance, which would imply that certain security aspects and 
responsibilities were conferred to the EU institutions, did not exist to a sufficient degree 
(Hill, 1993:320). Hill notes, that it was also seen as a worrying fact, that such a mutual 
obligation could damage NATO’s importance. NATO already had the established 
operational and bureaucratic capacity to perform military operations, and maintain a 
connection to the United States army and influence (Ibid). 
 
During the Cold War, Europe had been used to the Americans guarantees for security, so 
the development of its own ability to defend its own boarders had been neglected. The 
military and security coordination had during the Cold War also been through NATO, so 
the EU had not developed sufficient institutional changes to live up to a new needed role 
of securing its own “backyard” (Hill, 1993:321). A full scale European defence policy 
would mean that the administrative and operational costs of the CFSP would go onto the 
European Union budget. In such an event, Hill argue, the EU would have to start a 
taxation scheme, which would be a very unrealistic scenario. The EU simply did not have 
the needed resource capacity to fulfil the expectations. Nor did it have the essential 
operational capacity at hand. As Hill argues, the EU did not possess its own Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, a diplomatic service, common European troops, an active defence of its 
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boarders or even a common judicial personality.  
Hill argues that this gap between the expectations and capability, can be observed in the 
crisis of ex-Yugoslavia, where even a limited coordination of military intervention proved 
beyond the EU (Hill, 1993:326).  
3.2.3 The use of the Capability-Expectation gap  
In this project, the Capability-Expectation gap theory will be used to determine if the 
implementation of the LT has made the EU more efficient as a global security actor. If the 
gap has been narrowed or even closed, then it would most likely be a result of this 
implementation. As described in the introduction, a gap, be it narrowed or closed, is 
presumed to exist post-Lisbon. This is defined in the analysis, and the reasonableness of 
these new expectations are discussed.  
3.3 New Institutionalism 
When describing the institutions of the EU it can be beneficial to understand the actions 
and development of the institutions in the context of institutionalism. This gives several 
tools which helps to explain the policies being developed in the EU, the following 
chapter gives a brief overview of the different kinds of institutionalism which exists, and 
presents the arguments as to how the different types can explain the EEAS and the CFSP. 
The chapter then continues on to apply the theories of institutionalism while describing 
the EEAS. 
Within the theory of institutionalism there exist three different paths:   
3.3.1 Rational choice 
The Rational Choice institutionalism is based on the rational choice theory of utility-
maximizing actors who act logically and consistently towards their goals (Pallin, 
2012:20).  
32 
 
Rational institutionalism sees institutions as a constraining force on the behaviour of 
individuals, meaning that one of the reasons for the creation of institutions is the 
institutions power to regulate the included actors’ behaviour and thus produce more 
(socially) desirable outcomes (ibid). 
Changes to institutions come, when they fail to  produce the outcomes they were created 
to do, these changes are instigated  as a strategic decision by the actors when the 
dysfunctional nature of the institutions fail to produce the results the actors expect from 
them (ibid). 
Even though actors are essential to the shaping of institutions and determining the rules 
and limits of the implementation, the power within the institutions should not be 
underestimated, especially their ability to shape strategies. Rational institutionalism focus 
on the agenda setting powers of the institutions which can be used to influence and 
stabilize the volatile decision making of the elected officials. This agenda setting power 
of the bureaucracies causes a structure induced equilibrium which ensures that change is 
slowed and that the interests of the institutions are protected in this equilibrium (Pollack, 
2009:126). 
Finally there is the concept of transaction cost which helps enhance decision making and 
efficiency among groups, actors and between institutions. The institutions lower the costs 
of agreements but can also be used by actors to create status quos that are cost intensive 
to change once made, this is called locking in the interests of the actors to secure them 
from rapid change (Pallin, 2012:21). 
3.3.2 Sociological and constructivist institutionalism 
In contrast with the focus on the formal delegation of power and competences of the 
Rational choice theory which describes institutions as materialistic, the sociological 
institutionalism describes institutions more as a collection of ideas, values as well as 
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informal norms and conventions of a more constructivist approach (Pallin, 2012:31)  
This means that institutions shape the actors perceptions and that these therefore over 
time starts to act with a logic of appropriateness, taking cues from the institutional 
environment as they construct the policies in accordance with the formal and informal 
rules of the institutions (Pollack, 2009:127). 
The institutional environment plays a large role in how the institutions changes in the 
sociological institutionalism. It is argued that institutions will emulate other institutions 
who faces the same environmental conditions in order to gain legitimacy and social 
approval (Pallin, 2012:38f) 
3.3.3 Historical institutionalism 
As the name suggests, Historical institutionalism (HI) focuses on the history of the 
institutions, it states that decisions of the past continue to influence the behaviour of the 
institutions so that they only change slowly over time compared to the political landscape 
they exist in. Moreover this change often comes by external shocks or institutional 
change, whereas rational choice believe the institutions are deliberately designed by 
contemporary actors for the efficient performance of specific functions (Pallin, 2012:29) 
(Pollack, 2009:127). 
It is argued in HI that institutions show path dependence, in that once they have started 
down a path and made an institutional choice, the costs of reversal is very high. This 
means that there are critical junctures, moments of uncertainty, where a number of new 
paths and choices are possible. Once a decision is made it becomes increasingly difficult 
to go back and chose a different policy path even if the political environment changes or 
the chosen policy proves to be inferior in cost and effects ((Pallin, 2012:30). This self-
sustaining effect, that institutions can have on policies is called increasing returns and 
provides a great deal of stability to the institution. This does not mean however that the 
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policy path will never change, it simply requires a sufficiently large enough political or 
environmental pressure to create an institutional crisis in which a new critical juncture 
arise, and creates a new path (ibid). 
3.3.4 The use of New Institutionalism 
In this project all three kinds of institutionalism will be used, to show how the EEAS acts 
in relation to other institutions, actors and how the division of power in relation to the 
CFSP is delegated after the LT went into effect. Each type of institutionalism contributes 
with something different in explaining the behaviour of the EEAS and the division of 
power, while complementing each other in their explanation (Pollack, 2009:128). In the 
analysis of the EEAS several key concept from above are used, such as: path dependence, 
emulation of other institutions, agenda setting power and rational actors in order to 
explain some of the reasons for the division of powers and the actions of the EEAS. 
3.3.5 Critique of New Institutionalism 
While the three different paths of New are complementary as described above there has 
been some critique from the Constructivist approach that the rational institutionalism is 
flawed by a restrictive set of assumptions of the actors involved in the policy process. 
The critiques points out that rational institutionalism does not take into account the 
preferences and identities of the people who interact with the institutions and thus misses 
the crucial point of how these are affected by the institutions and in turn affect the 
institutions. This may lead to a severe underestimation of the impact and importance of 
the EU institutions (Pollack 2009:142).  
New institutionalism has also been criticized for not focusing on the European 
integration, but more with the results of this integration, namely the institutional 
development. This can limit the scope of an analysis using New Institutionalism, since it 
primarily explores the institutions as intervening variables in EU politics, but does not 
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explore the integrational consequences of the institutions. (ibid.). 
3.4 Normative Power 
3.4.1 Introduction 
Ian Manner’s article “Normative Power Europe – A Contradiction in Terms” from 2000, 
describes what civilian power, military power and normative power is, and how it is used 
specifically in relation to the EU. The focus of this theory lies on explaining normative 
power, where it stems from in the EU and how it is used in foreign and security policy. 
This is because Manners argue that the EU is most effective and capable in negotiations 
and the like with other countries, when it uses normative power rather than civilian or 
military power (Manners, 2000:3). 
It should be noted that the article is written, in part, as a response to critique of the EU’s 
seeming lack of unity between member states, and apparent weakness in foreign 
relations. Ian Manners’ main argument is that this critique is mostly missing the point. 
The EU’s main strength and role is not to act like a Westphalian state or federation, like 
USA, in foreign relations and should therefore not use the same powers or be compared 
to such states. According to Manners, where the EU has been successful in the past, is in 
the use of primarily the Copenhagen Criteria and neighbourhood policy to change the 
norm and promote human rights and democracy in its neighbouring countries (Manners, 
2000:33f). 
Finally it is important to remember that the article being referred to in this section is 
written in 2000, and it is possible that some statements are outdated because of the 
changes the EU has gone through since then. This is why an interview conducted with Ian 
Manners for this project, will be utilized in the analysis where necessary.  
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3.4.2 Definitions (Civilian power, Mili tary power & Normative power) 
Civilian power 
This is described as economic power or the ability to use economic instruments. 
This form of power predisposes, that the EU has power in negotiations, by way of a large 
economy and market. The power is then based in the ability to economically support, 
through e.g. trade agreements or financial aid, which can persuade foreign countries to 
agree with the EU (Manners, 2000:26). 
Military power 
This is ability to use military instruments such as interventions and having a standing 
army.  
This form of power can be described as coercion, as influence in negotiations and global 
politics is provided via the threat of using force or the actual use of force (Manners, 
2000:26f)  
Within an EU context, this primarily entails the CSDP, with which most EU-MS have 
agreed to a common defence policy, and simultaneously have the ability to impose 
sanctions or intervene in foreign countries if every MS agrees. The MS, which are part of 
the CSDP, still have the ability to act on its own in foreign matters. 
Normative power 
Normative power is the power to change the norm or the ethics of the international 
community, through example setting and negotiations. This form of power is more 
indirect than both hard (military) and soft (civilian) power in that it lacks any direct 
consequences if other country does not follow. It is more a form of power through 
example than anything else, although the use of normative power can be utilized in 
connection with civilian and military power.  
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This power is mostly grounded in EU treaties and the Copenhagen Criteria, which 
underlines the importance of promoting ideals such as democracy, human rights and 
personal and economic liberties. EU is also against discrimination in different areas like 
nationality, race, sexuality and other similar areas. Normative power is based in co-
integration, as the goal is to make other global or regional actors integrate the EU-ideals 
(Manners, 2000:30). 
(Definition of Civilian, Military and Normative Power) 
Civilian Power Military Power Normative Power 
Ability to use economic 
instruments 
Ability to use military 
instruments 
Ability to shape 
conceptions of ‘normal’ 
(Manners, 2000:29) 
3.4.3 Why Normative power? 
Ian Manners regards normative power as the most important and successful form of 
power the EU has. This is because the EU is neither a state nor a federation like USA, 
China or Russia, which are countries that primarily use hard or soft power in foreign 
relations. EU consists of 28 member states with approximately 28 different opinions. The 
most common denominator in regards to foreign policy is neighbourhood policies 
because of security questions, and the spread of democracy, human rights and free trade 
with industrial countries. 
Ian Manners does not necessarily view this as a bad thing, because the lack of hard power 
means EU does not instil the same fear as those countries do in regimes around the world. 
This means a dictatorship is more likely to negotiate with the EU, or with EU as 
mediator, because it is not as intimidating. The EU can act as the ethical and moral 
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example, not only to dictators but also to allies of the EU. 
3.4.4 Use in this project 
Ian Manners Normative power is chosen because he emphasizes the use of normative 
power, and describes it in more depth than most other theorists working with EU foreign 
relations. The theory also serves the purpose of introducing Ian Manners definition of the 
concepts of soft, hard and normative power. 
Normative Power Theory is used directly in the final discussion of the project. In the 
discussion the findings from the analyses of capability-expectations gap theory are 
discussed from a Normative Power viewpoint, to find out if the expectations were 
reasonable and if the EU acts accordingly regarding foreign and security policies. 
3.4.5 Critique of Normative Power 
The Normative Power theory has some shortcomings in describing the EU. The main 
problem being that the EU has gone through some major changes, since it was published 
in 2000, mainly with the implementation of the LT. As previously described, the 
interview with Ian Manners is partly conducted to get a more contemporary 
understanding of the theory.  
Normative Power theory can also be criticised for being too idealistic and normative in its 
description of the EU, by holding that the EU should act through normative power. This 
is why the theory is only used in the last discussion of the project, to discuss the results of 
the analyses in a different perspective. 
3.5 Delimitation of theories 
During the process of structuring this project a lot of different grand theories have been 
researched, this is because the realm of international politics and foreign relations is a 
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subject, on which a great deal of research has been conducted. In this section, some of the 
theories considered, but not chosen, are described. While they could have helped explain 
some of the same mechanisms and phenomena’s as the ones chosen. Neo-Functionalism 
is one of these theories. It could have been used to explain development of power 
between the states and institutions. It was not chosen as it was seen as being too focused 
on the effects of integration to be of relevance to the problem. Realism as a theory was 
also part of the initial research, but as an international theory it was seen as being too 
focused on the MS. The last theory is Liberal Intergovernmentalism which could have 
helped explain the actions of the MS in deciding the EU’s actions, but does not take the 
supranationality of the institutions into account. In a project where the institutions 
capabilities are researched, this theory was simply inadequate. 
Throughout the research of the topic, several preconceptions and concepts related to these 
in the discourse about the EU were found. However these theories have been deliberately 
deselected, as they are see in this project more as background knowledge, than as relevant 
theories to explain this exact problem, in a satisfactory way. 
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4. (I) Identifications of Competences 
 
- What are the EU’s foreign and security competences following the Lisbon Treaty? 
In this chapter the primary institutions are described, in order to create an overview of the 
complex structure of the decision making process, of the EU foreign policy. These 
institutions are then analysed using the theory of New Institutionalism in order to 
understand what capabilities the EU’s CFSP have, to pursue its goals.   
4.1 Distribution of competences  
4.1.1 The Lisbon Treaty’s fundamental changes 
The LT was signed on the 13th December 2007 and entered into force on the 1st of 
December 2009 (Europa, 2013b). The treaty was by many accounts a diluted version of 
the rejected “Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe”, but contained the same 
points and changes (Wetter 2009:50). As this paper focus on the development of the EU’s 
foreign security capabilities, the changes that are outlined is according to this. Most 
importantly are the changes in the CFSP and the new creations of the EEAS and the HR. 
4.1.2 The CFSP 
The CFSP was developed after the implementation of the Maastricht treaty and greatly 
revised after the LT. The CFSP has its origins in the European Political Cooperation 
(EPC) from 1970-93, which was merely a consultation process between the MS with the 
aim of creating common agreements and approaches (Europa.eu 2012c). Unlike the EPC 
that worked outside the institutional framework, the CFSP was the first attempt to create 
a formal common foreign policy that explicitly brought political and military-defence 
components into the Union (Europa.eu 2012d). It became the 2nd pillar of the EU-
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structure, and was a strictly intergovernmental body, where decisions were to be made 
unanimously (Ibid). With the merging of the pillars, a consequence of the LT, this 
decision-making process did not change(Ibid). With the new treaty implemented 
however, a host of new institutions and changes to the policy process were created.  
The power of the policy process of the CFSP is still largely in the hands of the 
governments of the MS, in that the European Council, consisting of the heads of states, 
defines the principles and general guidelines for the CFSP as well as common strategies 
to be implemented by the EU. The more concrete policies are then decided unanimously 
by the Foreign affairs council (FAC), a body within the council consisting of the foreign 
ministers and sometimes joined by the ministers of defence and trade.  
4.1.3 HR and EEAS 
The monthly meeting at the FAC is chaired by the HR. The HR is responsible for the long 
term consistency of the CFSP, a change away from the more volatile policy making of the 
6-month presidency which had great power over the CFSP pre-Lisbon 
.(Responsibility of the HR) 
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Besides chairing the meetings at the FAC the HR is also a vice president of the 
Commission, and head of the EEAS. The Commission has lost some of its power after 
the creation of the EEAS, which has taken over many of the Commissions former 
responsibilities like diplomatic representations in third countries. However, the division 
between the responsibilities of the Commission and the EEAS is often blurred and it is in 
some cases up to the HR to decide the delegation of responsibilities due to her dual role 
in both institutions. 
The EEAS was created after the LT which compelled the MS to work harder towards a 
common foreign and security policy. In article 27 in the Treaty on the European Union 
(TEU), it is stated that the EEAS is to be created in order to assist the HR. To describe the 
EEAS as simply assisting the HR in her job is a narrow way of describing the EEAS, 
which today has budget of 500 million Euros and employs a staff of 3.400 officials as 
well as 139 delegations all over the world (Smith, 2013). 
According to the Article 27(3) of the TEU, The exact workings of the EEAS were to be 
defined later on by a Council decision. This decision was created in July 2010 and 
establishes the EEAS as a separate institution which functions autonomously from the 
General Secretariat, the Council and from the Commission. 
There is a great deal of confusion as to what exactly the role and duties of the EEAS is, 
this is due to opposing interests between MS and between the other EU institutions, the 
confusion is also caused by the fact that the implementation phase, has been plagued by 
staffing and operational difficulties well after the EEAS became fully functional in 2012 
(Dover, 2013:250). 
In many ways the EEAS can be seen as a ministry of foreign affairs for the EU, it 
coordinates external relations and helps prepare policy proposals for the Council, the HR 
and the European Parliament (EP), but in many ways its competences goes beyond the 
role of a foreign ministry as it also plays a leading role in the security and development 
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aid policies of the union. On the other hand it is also less than a traditional ministry of 
foreign affairs since it lacks a role in defining the foreign policy which is mainly the 
duties of the European council, FAC, the MS and to a lesser degreed the Commission 
(Smith, 2013).  
4.1.4 CFSP after the Lisbon Treaty 
In this section, the development of CFSP and the new creations of hard power capacity 
will be analysed. As Hill has explained (Section 3.2), the creation of a new Treaty or a 
major change in the institutional framework will spike the expectations to the EU’s 
ability to act as a global security actor. Therefore, to explain the contemporary 
expectations and capability of the EU, it is important to understand this development of 
the CFSP, as it gives a reflection of the EU’s actual capabilities. 
 This analysis examines the implementation of HR and EEAS, and tries to understand the 
extent of their influence and their roles in the decision-making process. However, just to 
describe the development does not seem sufficient, as some of the institutional changes 
and relations can only be grasped through a theoretical understanding. Therefore, in the 
following chapter these different institution’s relations and their subsequent powers are 
analysed using New Institutionalism to explain the actions and relations within the policy 
area. 
Furthermore, this analysis main focus is on the new measures implemented with the LT, 
but will not be limited to that, as some new important initiatives was implemented post-
Lisbon. 
4.1.5 EEAS 
The EEAS was created to enable a better consistency and coherence in the EU’s CFSP, 
this was to be achieved by creating the service in a space between the Commission and 
the Council in order to further cooperation between these two institutions, which 
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traditionally has had the greatest influence on the CFSP (Helwig, Ivan & Kostanyan 
2013:6). The creation of the EEAS can be seen as a critical junction in the history of the 
CFSP. The concentration of powers and competences in a new independent institution 
with a powerful leader, can be seen as a significant step away from the previous path of 
the CFSP, where the MS held most of the executive powers. Whether or not this in reality 
has translated into a greater degree of supranationalism in the area of CFSP is another 
matter discussed below. 
 
(Box 4- Path dependency and critical junctures) 
The creation of the EEAS and the reformation of the CFSP can be seen as an expression 
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of the wishes of the rational actors involved in process. These high level political actors 
within the EU primarily consists of the MS, both within the intergovernmental 
framework of the Council, but also in their roles outside the Council, and of the 
Commission which has previously held the executive powers of the CFSP. Both of these 
actors wanted a more effective foreign policy apparatus of the EU (Helwig, Ivan & 
Kostanyan; 2013:22f). 
 
“The creation of the EEAS is aimed at enabling greater coherence and efficiency in the 
EU's External action and increasing its political and economic influence in the world.” 
(Pallin, 2012:22) 
 
But at the same time, as the rational, utility-maximizing, self-serving actors they are, the 
MS were unwilling to lose influence in such an important policy area. This has led to a 
situation where the competences of the CFSP are still spread over many actors although it 
is less clear than before the apparent centralization after the LT. An example is how many 
of the Directors-generals (DG) relating to foreign policies is still under the Commission, 
another way the Commission exerts influence over the EEAS is through their budgetary 
control over the operational budget (Helwig, Ivan & Kostanyan, 2013:23). 
Another important actor in the formation of the EEAS was the HR, the position was 
created a year before the EEAS and had significant influence over the organization of the 
new institution, indeed it was stated in the LT that the organization of the EEAS was to be 
decided by the Council after proposals from the HR (Helwig, Ivan & Kostanyan, 
2013:26). An example of this was the attempt by the HR to staff the EEAS with 
personnel from national diplomatic services, instead of a transfer of personnel from the 
Commission. If the HR Ashton had been successful in this pursuit it would perhaps have 
resulted in a lesser sense of “Community spirit” from the onset and would thus have 
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granted her greater powers in shaping the more informal aspect of the new institution 
(Helwig, Ivan & Kostanyan, 2013:24). This relates to Sociological Institutionalisms 
concept of contructivistic institutions, where the collective norms and values shape the 
policy process of the institutions, since they start to act with a logic of appropriateness 
when the actors with the institutions are influenced by the institutional environment.   
 As it were, the EP succeeded in ensuring that at least 60 % of the staff is permanent EU-
officials, it is thus reasonable to assume that a lot of the culture and informal procedures 
of the EEAS has been imported from the Commission. However, this has also helped in 
reducing the institutional tensions in the crucial working relationship between the 
Commission and the EEAS, who inevitably disagreed on the distribution of competences 
in some areas. It has also given a greater sense of continuity from the old system to the 
new, which again is a sign of path dependency as well as emulation of previous accepted 
institutions since the actors involved in establishing the EEAS were unwilling to stray too 
far from the established norms. 
The above is a rare case of EP influence over the CFSP. As any rational actor it too 
attempts to gain influence over this important policy area. It has achieved some success 
in that the EEAS has budgetary accountability towards the EP, and the HR has to consult 
the EP on CFSP decisions (Helwig, Ivan & Kostanyan, 2013:24). 
The EEAS’s limited executive power is heavily tied with that of the HR and revolves 
around the position’s ability to issue statements, these can both be on the behalf of the 
MS and behalf of the HR herself. However it is often difficult for the international 
community to differentiate between the two, and a statement on behalf of the HR can be 
misinterpreted as the position of the entire Union with the consent of the MS, despite this 
not being the case (Helwig, Ivan & Kostanyan, 2013:21). This means that the HR can use 
these statements for a more assertive foreign policy of the EU and draw more attention to 
her position and influence through stronger statements than the MS would agree to, since 
statements on behalf of all the MS are often an expression of the lowest common 
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denominator. This of course needs to be carefully balanced since a MS can choose to 
contradict the HR openly, which would shatter the credibility of the HR and the CFSP. 
However, this is not something the MS are interested in, so if they are discontent with her 
actions they would most likely deal with it internally (Helwig, Ivan & Kostanyan, 
2013:21f).  This action of making pronounced statements that stretches the limits of the 
competences of the HR, is not only an attempt to make the EU a more efficient and 
assertive global security power, but also a result of the competition between the President 
of the Commission, the President of the European Council and the HR. While they all 
have specifically defined areas of responsibility in regards to CFSP they often comment 
on areas outside their competences (Helwig, Ivan & Kostanyan, 2013:23).  
The EP can often be counted on as a source of support for the HRs attempts to create a 
more assertive and unified EU position, which goes beyond the lowest common 
denominator of the MS. While the EP influence on foreign affair matters are often 
negligible, it has managed to achieve a measure of co-decision power with the Council in 
regards to the EEAS, by threatening to block decisions on budget and staffing. The EPs 
role in CFSP matters is still mostly of a consulting nature, it is nevertheless often listened 
to since a hostile EP can generated a lot of problems for the Council, especially in regards 
to the budget negotiations. An example of cooperation between the HR and the EP was 
the joint effort to create a constructive dialog between Serbia and Kosovo in which the 
EP passed a resolution that underlined the importance of the recognition of Kosovo by all 
MS (Helwig, Ivan & Kostanyan, 2013:54). The EP does however often go beyond the HR 
in their pursuit for a more cohesive and assertive foreign policy by the EU, this was 
shown in the Libya case where some MEP’s argued for a no-fly zone which the HR did 
not endorse since the MS had not consented to this. This was seen by the MEP’s as a 
failure on the part of the HR, who they wished had taken the initiative and then attempted 
to persuade the MS to a compromise (Helwig, Ivan & Kostanyan, 2013:55). 
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Delegations 
Another source of newfound Parliamentary power in regards to CFSP is their right to 
“exchange views” with the heads of the EEAS-run EU delegations right after their 
appointment, this ensures coordination between the delegations and the EP (Helwig, Ivan 
& Kostanyan, 2013:56). These EU delegations are the former Commission delegations 
which are present in 139 countries around the world and now represents the entire Union 
instead of just the Commission (Helwig, Ivan & Kostanyan, 2013:62) However, they 
have to some extend become the victim of path dependency, as they have changed very 
little after the expansion of their competence area. If they wish to increase their 
importance and visibility, the delegations need to increase the cooperation with the 
embassies of the MS on more political matters, as well as with the Commission, which is 
still in charge of important foreign policy areas such as trade and enlargement (Helwig, 
Ivan & Kostanyan, 2013:62).  
Despite these problems of integration among the institutions, the more political role of 
the EU delegations have paid off in increased visibility and greater impact in the majority 
of the host countries, due to the delegations role of representing EU statements and 
demarches and to permanently chair EU internal coordination meetings with the MS’ 
national embassies (Helwig, Ivan & Kostanyan, 2013:62) A further area of expertise, 
which the EEAS controlled delegations are trying to involve itself in is the consular 
protection of EU citizens in non-EU countries. This is to be merely in a supporting 
manner to the MS embassies or in the form of a pooling of resources in order to cut costs. 
However, this is still a developing area for EEAS that require greater funding and 
political backing from the MS in order to be successful, something the MS are unlikely to 
agree to since some MS see their diplomatic representation and the consular protection of 
their citizens as core elements of their sovereignty (Helwig, Ivan & Kostanyan, 2013:65). 
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The EEAS was supposed to ensure a greater horizontal coherence, however the sharing of 
competences with other organizations in many areas such as preparatory working groups, 
creates a series of horizontal checks among the institutions which decentralizes the power 
of the CFSP institutions and slows down the decision making process. An example of this 
is how the EEAS’s preparatory work has to pass through COREPER (Comité des 
Représentants Permanents) and is subject to a horizontal check on institutional, financial 
and legal implications before being passed on to the Council, while such checks are 
definitely important, is slows down the process and gives the Council less time to act in a 
crisis situation, which undermines the credibility of the CFSP (Helwig, Ivan & 
Kostanyan, 2013:15). 
 
As described above, the creation of the EEAS was supposed to move the bureaucratic 
competences of the CFSP away from the Commission and some of the executive powers 
away from the rotating presidency to a position between the Council and the 
Commission. The idea was to enhance the coordination between these two institutions by 
having an independent institution whose leader had important positions within both the 
Commission and the Council. However, there is some fear that this has led to a loss of 
supranationalism in the area of CFSP and that this new division of powers has led to a 
greater degree of control by the MS, this could potentially also lead to a politicization of 
the work of the EEAS (Helwig, Ivan & Kostanyan, 2013:2). 
 
EEAS’s agenda 
As noted earlier the EEAS has a lot of agenda setting power since they brief the HR, the 
FAC and a number of other senior officials, they also chair and sit on some of the 
workgroups involved in policy planning. According to the theory of institutionalism the 
EEAS will likely use this power to enhance their own interests. Identifying their interests 
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is not easy, but generally the EU institutions seek to further the supranational agenda of 
the EU. Since the EEAS was created to enhance the cooperation and integration of the 
CFSP actors it is natural to assume that they are pursuing this object by advocating a 
more supranational approach to the CFSP. Once more a lot of their ability to do so is 
dependent on how the HR chooses to interpret her job description. In the weakest sense 
she is no more than a spokesperson for the decisions of the European Council, in its 
strongest interpretation the holder of the position of HR can set the pace and the agenda 
of the negotiations in the Council, compromise between the MS and influence the 
implementation of these decisions. So far the actions of the HR has fluctuated from case 
to case, which can be seen as the uncertainty of the new holder of the position, but also as 
sign of the balancing act between the supranational and intergovernmental powers within 
the EU that the HR has to appease if she wishes to further the EU as a global security 
actor. 
 
4.2 Hard power after Lisbon 
The hard power ability of the EU, has been greatly revised since 1993, and especially 
since the LT. 
In regards to the expectations of the EU being able to act united, the operational capacity 
will be outlined in accordance to their capacity to act upon security crisis’. Two different 
aspect of this appears to be the most important: 
 Capacity to military action  
 Capacity to sanction 
4.2.1 ESDP/CSDP 
In 1999 the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) was created, as the successor 
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of the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) (George, 2013), and after the LT it 
was named Common Security Defence Policy (CSDP). The ESDI had been under NATO 
jurisdiction, but with the creation of ESDP it became a major integrated part of CFSP, 
controlled formally by the European Council (Europa.eu 2012a). The ESDP was 
established as a consequence of several meetings between European leaders after the 
Unions insufficient military capacity in the armed conflict of Kosovo (1998-99) (BBC 
News, 1999). The newly elected UK Labor Government with Tony Blair as prime 
minister together with France called for the creation of an EU with capability of 
“autonomous action backed up by credible military forces” (EEAS, 2013e). This goal 
was confirmed by the European Council in the Helsinki Headline Goal, where all MS 
confirmed their commitment to together create a European Rapid Action Force under the 
guidance and operational control of the ESDP (EEAS, 2013a). With the capability to use 
troops made available by the MS, the ESDP/CSDP became increasingly active, and had 
by the 1st of January 2013 been active in 25 missions, where 7 of them were military 
operations. Even though the ESDP control these operations, it still requires an unanimous 
decision by the European Council and the troops still need to be Ad-hoc based, which 
leaves much to the availability of the nation’s military spending and ability. To counter 
this, and to improve their rapid reaction ability, France, UK and Germany proposed the 
concept of Battlegroups (EEAS, 2013a) (Lindstrom, 2007:11) 
4.2.2 Battlegroups 
The creation of the Battlegroups is one of the new implementations that were created in 
an attempt to strengthen the EU’s operational capabilities, more specifically to improve 
the “European capabilities in planning and deploying forces at short notice, including 
the initial deployment of land, sea and air forces within 5-10 days” (Lindstrom, 2007: 9). 
The Battlegroup Concepts itself had been mentioned in various forms since 1999, but was 
finally drafted by the Big Three, UK, France and Germany in 2004 (Lindstrom, 2007:11), 
and was fully operational in 2007 (Economist, 2013b). The Battlegroup Concepts consist 
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of nineteen Battlegroups that has a size of 1500 troops plus an engineering, medical and 
combat support team, that is committed by the MS (Lindstrom, 2007:15f). Each 
Battlegroup has a lead nation but often also has troop and support contribution from other 
MS, like the “French-German Battlegroup”, that consist of France, Germany, Belgium, 
Luxembourg and Spain. The Battlegroups can be used in different scenarios, of which 
active combat in both stand-alone operations and assisting other EU armies, are the most 
prominent (Lindstrom, 2007:18f). In a rotating system two out of the 18 different 
Battlegroups, always have to be ready for deployment. They are a part of CDSP, but can 
only be activated by a unanimous decision in the European Council. They are by many 
different sources described as a “new standing army” and as the European “swat team” 
(Raynolds, 2007). But their actual operational capacity is hard to make a complete 
assessment off, since they have never been activated. They are however modelled after a 
successful example of an EU intervention in Congo in 2003, where the operational 
capacity of EU seemed very capable. In this instance France were the lead country, but 
with the approval of the European Council several countries attributed and the military 
structure was through the EU. These Battlegroups can be seen as an emulation of other 
institutions since they are an attempt to bring the military efficiency of NATO’s rapid 
response units into the EU CFSP area. It is also an attempt to institutionalize previous 
missions and thus create the institutional tools for a less ad-hoc based intervention policy 
by EU, thus lowering the transactions cost of future negotiations about an intervention. 
Since France and the UK are often the primus motors of these interventions, the creation 
of Battlegroups can be seen as an attempt by these MS to “Lock in” their preferences in 
that it will probably be easier to convince other MS in the future that an EU intervention 
is necessary now that the tools for doing so exists  
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(Emulation of institutions and the influence of norms on the policy process) 
4.2.4 Crisis Platform 
Since the LT one important instrument created in CSDP to the EEAS is the Crisis 
platform. When a crisis happens, the need for a comprehensive and united response lies at 
the heart of the CSDP, and the Crisis Platform gives the institutions a forum to utilize. 
The Crisis Platform was implemented to be able to organize the relevant instruments – 
these being political, diplomatic, economic, financial, military, consular and development 
aid related. These instruments should give the EU a more efficient, coherent and timely 
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response to newly developed and on-going crises with better coordination of civilian and 
military capabilities (EEAS, 2013b).  
 
A critique of the EUs crises management came in regards to the Libya crisis, where it was 
shown that NATO had four strategic plans of action within two weeks of the crisis, while 
the EU only managed a proper response nearly two months after. This has led to an 
attempt to emulate NATO by making a more permanent planning structure like that of 
NATO. However, because of the differences between the MS and the political 
environment, this failed to materialise (Koenig, 2012:2). It led to a council decision of a 
revision of the planning procedure with the post-Lisbon institutional structures, in order 
to streamline and shorten the planning process. The process of doing this was also a 
political sensitive area, because skipping steps in the planning process or centralizing 
information’s meant cutting actors out. This resulted in another problem where a lot of 
rational actors all were afraid of losing influence in the critical phase of planning. The 
positive effect would be a reduced transaction cost in regards to these operations (Koenig, 
2012:3). 
A more streamlined and efficient planning process would also make it more realistic to 
bring in EU Rapid reactions instruments in this case of a crisis and in the example of the 
Battlegroups. It is within the framework of CSDP and the Crisis Platform that the 
Battlegroups can be activated - this has yet to happened, mostly due to resistance from 
MS. In the aftermath of the Libya crisis the FAC underlined the importance of being able 
to use these Battlegroups and have a better civilian response in CSDP operations, as it 
was the MS who did not want to activate the Battlegroups (Koenig, 2012:3). 
However, from the perspective of the EEAS the platform, though still in development, 
was a useful tool in regards to the Libya crisis. It facilitated and brought together all the 
available actors and resources into one forum.  
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However, one problem left unanswered was how old and new actors in the EU crisis 
management should interact as also seen in the horizontal checks imposed upon the 
EEAS by the old institutions as described above. This is especially troubling in regards to 
the MS fearing a loss of independence and sovereignty, if they start pooling and sharing 
resources (Koenig, 2012:3). 
Summary 
The Crisis Platform has become an integrated and important role of the EU response to 
crises. It has become an instrumental part of the decision making in the EU and as such 
give a centralized place for the EU institutions in regards to crisis management. The 
Crisis Platform has since been activated in the crisis of Libya, Congo and other cases 
(EEAS, 2013b). 
The important thing to derive from this is that the coordination within the EU in 
accordance with crisis management has strengthened, but at the same time it is not a fully 
permanent structure like NATO’s. This makes the EU crisis management more of an ad-
hoc nature and every situation have to be assessed on a individual basis. Though crisis 
management has been streamlined there are still problems within the forum, both 
between the old and new actors, and in regards to MS not wanting to lose their agenda 
setting power.  
4.2.5 Military staff 
Another military competence of the EEAS is the military planning Staff (EUMS) which 
is mainly responsible for three operational functions: Early warning, situation assessment 
and strategic planning (ISIS Europe, 2013). The EUMS is involved in the CSDP of the 
CFSP meaning that they prepare and coordinate military missions of the EU and advice 
the HR on military matters, they also report to the European Union Military Committee 
(EUMC) which is an intergovernmental body under the Council consisting of the MS 
Chiefs of defence (Council Decision 2001/80/CFSP of 22 January 2001 on the 
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establishment of the Military Staff of the European Union). The military Committee 
functions as the military adviser of the HR which is another clear example of the attempts 
to integrate the bureaucracies and the intergovernmental bodies of the CFSP in a more 
coercive manner (EU in Japan, 2011). The EUMS not only plays a role in the planning 
and execution of military missions, but is also involved in the creation of military 
capabilities of the Union and in coordinating political goals of the EU with the activities 
of the CSDP. This creation of a permanent military body and the decision to establish it 
within the framework of the EEAS is a great benefit for coordination of the CFSD 
policies of the EU (Isis Europe 2013). 
4.2.6 Permanent Structured Cooperation in Defence 
The Permanent Structured Cooperation in Defence (PSCD) is also a new creation of the 
LT. It is a procedure where a minimum of nine MS are allowed to establish integration or 
cooperation under the EU structure in a more integrated way, but without the interference 
of other MS (EU Observer, 2008). It is a way to ensure that MS who have strong military 
capabilities have the option to establish permanent structured cooperation within the EU 
framework, where they commit to each other under the supervision and guidance of the 
European Defence Agency (EDA) (Biscop & Coelmont, 2010:1f.). As it gives an 
occasion to discuss a “two speed Europe”, it is a controversial topic, and has not been 
activated (EU Observer, 2008), even though some praise the idea and the operational 
capacity it potentially presents (Biscop & Coelmont, 2010). This is a clear sign of the 
rational actors of the EU MS pursuing their interests as best they can; it is a realization 
that some MS sees it as in their best interests to strengthen their military integration while 
other might see their interests best served by staying out. The MS wishing to deepen the 
military cooperation probably also hopes that they can lock in their preferences in a new 
institutional setting. 
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4.2.7 Sanctions/Iran  
To understand the shift in power between the institutions, when it comes to foreign and 
security policy, one can look at who has final say when it comes to sanctions. Sanctions 
are arguably one of the EUs most important foreign policy tools, and the EU has devoted 
more attention to it since the Maastricht treaty. It is a tool utilised in as different areas as 
human rights protection, crisis management and non-proliferation (Giumelli & Ivan, 
2013:10f). 
The ability to impose sanctions falls under CFSP, in accordance with article 30 and 31 of 
the TEU. However, the right to initiate sanction negotiations lies with any MS, or the HR 
who can act with the support of the Commission. The European Council is the main 
actor, because it is the forum wherein the decisions are being made, this is also in regards 
to enforcement of economic and financial assistance. Before the LT, sanctions affecting 
the functioning of the internal marked, were in the hands of the Commission. However, 
after the LT the Commission has lost influence, and can now only suggest regulations 
which will ensure a more joint implementation. This has made the European Council the 
most influential actor, because it has the implementation power and the authority to 
approve the Commission’s suggestions (Giumelli & Ivan, 2013:11). 
Using Iran as an example, where there have been continuous sanctions – first in UN 
framework in the UN security Councils (UNSC) with resolution 1737 from 2006, and 
later on with more severe EU imposed sanctions (EEAS, 2013c). These sanctions have 
been imposed as an attempt to ensure non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, with the 
focus of slowing down Iran’s nuclear developments. The EU has been increasingly 
aggressive in this endeavour, since its sanctions are harsher and has gone further than the 
United Nations in its restrictive measures (Sanctions) (Giumelli & Ivan, 2013:11).  
The EU sanctions against Iran can be seen as a success of the new CFSP policy process. 
Since the concentration of power within one institution has made it easier to adopt such 
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sanctions, and this is clearly an example of lowered transaction costs, since the adoption 
of the sanctions by all MS has been made faster and easier after LT. The role of the EU 
has also increased in this area as it has been the coordinator in the diplomatic arena. The 
HR has acted as a mediator between the UN Security Council and Iran, as one of the key 
successors for a multilateral agreement (Sherman, 2013). 
Myanmar is a good example of how EU uses the sanctions tool to soft power. It illustrates 
how EU uses the sanctions tool as soft power to democratic, Humanitarian and liberal 
development. The development in Myanmar shows how sanctions were implemented, 
and then lifted slowly with the increased democratic development (EEAS, 2013d). 
This shows that the sanction tool is used a lot in regards to foreign policy and in most of 
the cases there is an agreement in Europe on a common approach. This is not always the 
case as seen with the weapons embargo against Syria, which was implemented and then 
later lifted. This was because UK and France wanted to support the arming of the rebels, 
a standpoint which was not shared by most of the other MS (Traynor, 2013). The Syrian 
example shows how important the intergovernmental agreements are to making 
sanctions, and that the institutions are forums for these. When it comes to the sanctions 
the EEAS role is of a more advisory nature. The EEAS makes intelligence suggestions 
about what measures are advisable, what and who to target and what the legal 
implications (Giumelli & Ivan, 2013:11). 
In the realm of foreign policy, in regards to EU, there is an indication that sanctions is 
still an effective tool if not more so due to the increased importance of the HR as a 
mediator, she can use the sanctions as a highly effective tool in her negotiations. 
However, since the decision making process has slipped away from the institutions and 
has been returned to MS. So even though there is a lower transaction cost one could argue 
that there is an agenda setting failure from the institutions in regards to decisions being 
made on an intergovernmental level instead of on a supranational level. 
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4.2.8 Libya 
In the Libya case there was a great degree of criticism of the HR’s lack of leadership in 
regards to the EU position on the crisis. The European position regarding the crisis was 
primarily pursued by the MS that made individual and opposing declarations on how to 
solve the crisis. As mentioned above the EP among others criticized the HR for not taking 
a leading role in the crisis and working for a compromise between the MS. As mentioned 
before the role of the HR is often a matter of interpretation. In this case she chose to 
interpret her role in the weakest sense, more as a spokesperson of the agreed position of 
the European Council, than as an active actor in shaping the policy process. However, 
this can also be seen as an expression of the limits of the CFSP, meaning that as soon as 
the debate starts to revolve around military intervention the supranational institution 
becomes side lined by the MS. This was compounded in the Libya case where the EU 
indecisiveness and lack of coercion was further demonstrated when France and the UK to 
a lesser degree, decided to make statements and proposals in the public and in the UN 
before a joint position had been agreed upon within the EU (Santini, 2011). This 
undermined the negotiations in the EU and especially the efforts of the HR since it would 
be difficult to make the UK and France agree to a common strategy that was less 
interventionist than their own public proclamations called for since this would make them 
lose international credibility. On the other hand the more cautious MS, led by Germany, 
who wanted a diplomatic solution through sanctions and other uses of non-military 
power, saw little point in continuing the negotiations in EU-regi when the UK and France 
had gone solo.  
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(Rational actors, lowered transaction cost and lock in) 
4.3 Part Conclusion 
The EEAS has some agenda setting powers over the CFSP, while it is not directly 
involved in the drafting of general conclusions, it assist the HR in her job and prepares 
briefings for the FAC and other important meeting in regards to the CFSP. It also supports 
the President of the Council and the President of Commission in their work in regards to 
CFSP (Consilium, 2009).  
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However it has been the victim of a turf war between the established institutions of the 
EU, who have tried to gain or retain influence over the CFSP area as seen in the example 
of how the EEAS staff should be composed, this has some instances led to a less assertive 
CFSP policy conduct due to the internal conflicts.  
The dual role of the HR / vice president of the Commission was supposed to enhance the 
coordination between the Commission and the EEAS, but some sources have criticized 
HR Ashton for focusing mostly on her role as HR and thereby neglecting her role in the 
Commission and thus degrading the amount of cooperation between the two institutions 
(Helwig, Ivan & Kostanyan, 2013:55). There can be no question that the LT and the 
subsequent creation of the EEAS have given EU the tools to pursue a more united foreign 
policy. The MS are having a hard time parting with the freedom of action, they have 
enjoyed so far and are thus making it difficult for the new CFSP institutions and the HR 
to navigate in foreign affairs when there are internal problems. Furthermore it should be 
noted that every mistake and failure that the HR is involved in makes the MS less likely 
to trust her to represent them, and thus make future successes more difficult to achieve.  
 It is not only in her role as the EU’s external representative that HR Ashton has received 
critique, her role as a compromiser between the MS in their pursuit of a common policy 
has also been problematic as seen in the Libya crisis.  
The CFSP is still dominated by the MS through the Council which constitutes an example 
of path dependency that is unlikely to change, since the cost of doing so would be 
immense. The self-serving nature of the rational actors would also be in the way of 
greater conferral of powers, as the actors would likely not see the gains as sufficient 
compensation for the enhanced lack of control with the policy process. However, this 
does not mean that further integration is not possible or likely, as there are many areas 
where the actors see benefits in a greater coherence of EU foreign strategies. This is also 
seen with the Crisis Platform, in which the MS united in order to create the necessary 
tools for EEAS to fulfil its commitments.  
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Since the EEAS and the post of HR are still so new, every foreign policy case can be seen 
as a critical juncture, where the future of the CFSP is being defined by the actions of the 
EEAS and the HR. In many ways further CFSP integration, is a question of time and 
success. If the EU institutions can prove their worth and generate successes, like the 
sanctions against Iran and the ensuing negotiations, where HR Ashton has gained status 
as the lead foreign diplomat ahead of the US, Russian and Chinese foreign ministers, the 
MS will eventually trust the EU to take over more of the responsibilities. 
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CHAPTER 5 
Analysis (II) 
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5. (II) Expectations gap post-Lisbon 
 
- What kind of capability-expectations gap exists in the EU following the 
implementations of the Lisbon Treaty? 
 
As outlined, the creation of EEAS and HR has made a significant change in the 
procedural process behind foreign policy decisions, and created new measures of hard 
power. These conclusions will be put in a theoretical context, when analysing the EU’s 
actual capabilities post-Lisbon. Therefore, this chapter discuss and analyse the 
contemporary expectations and capabilities. First, the internal and external expectations 
are clarified, and secondly the current capabilities of the EU are analysed. This is done 
partly in reference to the development of the EEAS, HR, Battlegroups and the Crisis 
Platform. 
5.1 Expectations 
According to Hill, both the internal and external expectations were in 1993 not in sync 
with the actual capabilities. It seems reasonable to assume that the expectations of the EU 
have changed since 1993, so the internal and external expectations post-Lisbon need to be 
understood. The external expectations are analysed from the demands of the US and 
Libya, and the internal expectations are analysed through the development of the EEAS, 
HR, Battlegroups and Crisis Platform. When Hill analyses the internal expectations, he 
emphasises how these are created by new initiatives, like treaties, reforms and new 
institutional framework.  
In this paper the traditional expectations of the Big Three to the EU are also identified in 
regards to the EU’s role as a global actor. This identification is done, as it allows the 
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paper to analyse whether the LT seems to have changed these expectations, and through 
that understand the MS willingness to act within the Union on security matters.  
5.1.1Traditional expectations of Member States 
As outlined in the first chapter, it is important to remember that the LT did not give way 
to the creation of supranational foreign decision procedures. The expectations of the MS 
were never that the EU should be able to act autonomously as a global security actor 
without the consent of the MS, but to reach intergovernmental decisions and then act in 
unison. This is an important fact to note, as this point is often absent when discussing the 
EU’s ability as a global security actor. The expectations, as explained and analysed in the 
first chapter, were that the EEAS and the HR would increase the consistence and 
coherence of the process in which MS reach decisions.  
However, this does not mean that the MS necessarily expect to be able to achieve a united 
voice when facing controversial security problems. This has to do mainly with the MS 
different expectations to the EU, because of the complexity of other ways in which they 
can fulfil their interests more efficient. NATO is the main “obstacle” for a united 
expectation from the MS to the EU’s security ability. The MS differ on which role NATO 
should have in security questions that mainly concerns Europe, and therefore differ over 
the expectation to the EU’s role.  
Instead of analysing every MS, it can be justified to just outline the expectations of the 
Big Three. This is done due to France and UK being, by far the biggest military powers, 
and Germany is the most important actor in all other aspects on the European scene 
(Lehne, 2012:7).  
The expectations of the Big Three, has been a question of many reports and articles, and 
they seem to have some kind of common understanding. 
 The UK 
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The UK has traditionally been sceptical regarding a common European defence and 
security policy, due to its commitment to preserving NATO and its history of working 
closely together with USA regarding foreign and security matters. Therefore, they seem 
to have the same concerns as the US, that a well-developed European defence initiative 
will make NATO redundant with the consequence that the US and European cooperation 
will be reduced; hurting both in the process (Lehne, 2012).  
In 2011 this was obvious when a plan, backed up by the HR, Germany and France, to 
create an operational military headquarter in Brussels was vetoed by UK (Waterfield, 
2011). 
The UK has, due to their general EU scepticism and their commitment to NATO, chosen 
to generally work against most initiatives to improve the EU’s decision making power or 
conferral of powers, that traditionally are reserved for MS or NATO. 
France 
France, on the other hand, has ambitions of playing a lead role with the EU as the central 
coalition (Lehne, 2012:27). They expect the EU to live up to the role of a global security 
actor, but in an intergovernmental system, which they fought for in the creation of the LT 
(Lehne, 2012:18f). This attitude of creating a stronger and more capable European 
defence system has in many years also been a consequence of not being a member of 
NATO (Brummer, 2006:11f). This however changed, when France joined NATO in 2009 
(Kern, 2009). Some analysts perceive this as a sign of France lowering the expectations 
of the EU’s  capabilities as a global security actor (Irondelle & Mérand, 2010), while 
others perceive it as France trying to “Europeanize” NATO, while creating an 
autonomous CSDP (Kern, 2009).  
Germany 
Germany’s expectations seem the most complex. They have Officials from Berlin have 
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stated, they wanted more ambitious competences and abilities for the EEAS, as they 
made clear during the LT negotiations (Lehne, 2012). On the other hand they are very 
restrictive about any kind of military action. Germany is opposed to intervening 
themselves, and reluctant to support hard power initiatives that demand direct 
involvement. It seems as if Germany want to evolve European capabilities in regards to 
foreign relations, but mostly in a soft power direction (Lehne, 2012:11). This arises both 
from the fact that Germany, unlike UK and France, does not have former colonies or any 
regional security issues which means that there are not any imminent threats to German 
interests or security. And from a deeply rooted aversion to German military aggression, 
which stems from World War II (Speck, 2011:2). 
 Traditional expectations for  
Common Foreign and Security Policy 
United Kingdom - Sceptical towards Common Foreign 
and Security Policy 
- Favours transatlantic alliances like 
NATO 
- Increasingly negative view of the EU 
France - Want a leading role in the EU 
Common Foreign and Security Policy 
- Expects EU to be a strong global actor 
- Wants a strong EU common defence 
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policy 
- Joined NATO in 2009, could be seen 
as France lowering expectations of the 
EU’s capabilities 
Germany - Wants strong EU foreign capability 
- However against activist foreign 
policy 
- Views NATO as the current primary 
defence cooperation  
(Traditional expectations among the Big Three) 
5.2 The internal expectations to the EU 
The Internal expectations of the EU’s ability to act as a global security actor, have had 
long time to develop, as the EU had not been faced with any serious security challenge 
since Iraq or Afghanistan, up till the Libya crisis. The internal expectations are explored 
in the time before the Libya crisis, as it allows this paper to explore the expectations that 
the LT culminated in. The outlined institutional changes and new hard power measures 
adopted will be the starting point for this analysis, as it is the purpose of these changes 
that is the most important reflection of the internal expectations. The starting point will 
therefore be an understanding of the purpose and hopes for the CFSP, Battlegroups, 
Conflict Platform and the HR.  
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5.2.1 The expectation to EU as a global actor 
The idea of the EU having a common defence has been discussed since the creation of the 
European Community. As mentioned, the main obstacle has always been the MS different 
perception of the purpose of the EU and NATO. Especially the UK has been very 
reluctantly in accepting any form of common defence.  
However, during a bilateral meeting in 1998 in Saint-Malo between France and the UK, 
there seemed to be a clear indication of a consensus on the evolution of a defence 
component for the EU (EEAS, 2013e). In their joint declaration they emphasize the need 
for a common European military force. The year after, in 1999, this led to the agreement 
of Cologne, in which the European Council decided that the EU should have the military 
capacity to respond to international crisis autonomously (Ibid). This led to the creations 
of several new institutions, as the mentioned Military Staff and Military Committee of 
EU (Ibid). Later that year in December, the European leaders met again, and in 
accordance with the agreement of Cologne agreed on the Helsinki Headline Goal. This 
was a declared ambition of creating a European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF) by 2003 
that could act with “autonomous action backed up by credible military forces” (EEAS, 
2013e). These goals and declarations were institutionalized in 2003, with the creation of 
the first European Security Strategy (ESS).  
The European Security Strategy 
The ESS was one of the most important initiatives, as it describes the ambitions of CFSP 
and the demands to its own development. The symbolic importance of the ESS is hard to 
overstate, as it for the first time gives the EU a strategy that identifies the security risks 
that the Union has to address in a certain way. The ESS was outlined in 2003 by former 
High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana as a 
response to the critique of the indecisiveness in regards to the Iraqi war, where the MS 
where deeply divided. The strategy detailed the vision of an EU with stronger and 
coherent diplomatic and military capabilities, which should be combined with the 
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resources of MS and the EU institutions. (Consilium, 2003:11). It concluded that the EU 
was a global player, and therefore had to take global security responsibility, on equal 
terms with the US. Most importantly it establishes the idea that the EU ought to combine 
military capacity with civil capacity, especially in regional crises that has security 
implications for Europe (s. 40-41 ESS).  
 
“We need to develop a strategic culture that fosters early, rapid and when necessary, 
robust intervention.” (Consilium, 2003:11-14). 
 
As the strategy was institutionalized when the European Council adopted it in December 
2003, as the framework for the CFSP in years to come (Europa.eu, 2012b), it was clear 
that the MS together with the Commission, on paper had the same goal of EU being a 
capable security actor with the means to address important issues.  
 
5.2.2 Battlegroups and Crisis Response 
As described, the Big Three drafted the Battlegroup Concepts in 2004, these were fully 
operational in 2007. By doing so, the Big Three were acting in accordance with the ESS, 
and the Helsinki Headline Goal. UK and France again emphasized the need for a 
European military capacity, when they presented the Battlegroup Concept as of a 
reflection of the Operation Artemis approach: 
 
“We propose a new initiative, in which the EU would focus on the development of its 
rapid reaction capabilities to enhance its ability to support the UN in short-term crisis 
management situations [...] we shall continue to work together on strengthening the EU's 
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effective military capability [...] Together we now propose that the EU should aim to build 
on this precedent so that it is able to respond through ESDP to future similar requests 
from the United Nations, whether in Africa or elsewhere. The EU should be capable and 
willing to deploy in an autonomous operation within 15 days to respond to a crisis.”(UK 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2003) 
 
The purpose of the Battlegroups and the use of EU as a military actor where also defined 
in the new “Helsinki Headline Goal 2010” in 2003:   
  
“The EU has the civilian and military framework needed to face the multifaceted nature 
of these new threats. […] The ability for the EU to deploy force packages at high 
readiness as a response to a crisis either as a stand-alone force or as part of a larger 
operation enabling follow-on phases [...] They will have to be backed up by responsive 
crisis management procedures as well as adequate command and control structures 
available to the Union.” (Council of the European Union, 2004:1f) 
 
This underlines the expectations of EU being able to act on different levels, with both a 
civilian and military approach. As analysed in the first chapter, the EU introduced this 
crisis management platform, where they combined both the military and civilian 
component to make a strategy that would be more comprehensive. At the same time, the 
LT furthermore described the scope for EU-missions that could activate EU military 
measures and crisis management, which now included “a disarmament operation”;  
 
“Common disarmament operations; military consulting and assistance assignments; 
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combat missions for the crisis management; peace-restoring and stabilization after a 
conflict has been resolved.” http://www.mfa.gov.lv/en/security/Directions/common-
policy/ 
 
As described in the first chapter, Lisbon also introduced the concept of Enhanced 
Cooperation. It gave room for instance using of the Battlegroups for those involved. It 
seems that the ambition here was to make sure that the EU could act, with or without all 
MS.   
The creation of the Battlegroups are very important when judging the expectations, as 
they have a major symbolic value, since their actions would be that of the EU, and not of 
a MS. Military power is something associated with statehood, and this gives a very 
powerful perception, when the EU suddenly control such an instrument. Many perceived 
the Battlegroup Concept as an excellent opportunity to create an autonomous European 
Army. The European Parliament passed a vote two times to make the Battlegroups the 
actual EU standing army, but since they had no competence in that field, it did not really 
matter.   
 
5.2.3 The High Representative  
As described in the first analysis the HR role was that of a mediator between the more 
powerful countries and as a link between the commission and the council. There was an 
expectation for the new HR to be able to steer MS countries to a common position, other 
than the lowest common denominator. As concluded, the HR position should ensure that 
compromises were made between the MS, so the EU could act more united. The EP for 
instance understood the HR’s role as being that of an autonomous Minister, that would 
act to set an example and not simply react to others. 
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Summary 
The internal expectations were that EU has adopted the measures appropriate for acting 
alone to secure its own borders. When looking at the ESS, Headline Goal, Battlegroup 
Concept and Crisis Platform the expectation seem to be, that the EU is as a minimum 
capable of acting rapidly in an overseas UN-mandated conflict with security implication 
for the EU, with a comprehensive strategy that includes both military and civilian means. 
The European Council’s confirmation of these initiatives and the HR’s ability to make 
compromises, set agendas and secure a more united approach, gives a perception of a 
more united EU. Furthermore, the statehood association of military power and a “Foreign 
Minister” leads to the expectations of an EU that is above and not beside the MS. The EP 
reflected this understanding when they voted for the Battlegroups to become a European 
standing army.  
To sum up, one could see the expectation of the ESS, Headline Goal, Battlegroup 
Concept and Crisis Platform as the operational capacity to act, whereas the expectation to 
the HR is to enhance their ability to agree to act. 
 
5.3 The external expectation to the EU 
Hill mainly defined the external expectations as according to the US, and their shift of 
attention after the dissolution of the USSR. As Europe’s number one allied, the greatest 
military power in the world and the main contributor to NATO, the general external 
expectations to EU are definitely shaped considerably by them.  
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5.3.1 The American Paradox  
In the US there seems to be much debate about the role of a united Europe and the 
expectations of such in regards to security.  
As far back as 2000, Washington was pressing the EU and its NATO partners to increase 
defence spending and, though with some reservations, let the EU continue with its plans 
to create a separate rapid reaction force, i.e. Battlegroups, that could engage in regional 
autonomous missions (Sands, 2003). It was stated by Washington that the US would 
never be indifferent to the threats faced by Europeans, but that it expected Europeans to 
“step up to the plate” to solve these threats (Lebl, 2009). Nonetheless the former US 
ambassador John Bolton indicated, just before the LT, that the creation of the EU rapid 
reaction force was not in the US interest. They shared the opinion of the UK, that a united 
and stronger EU would undermine NATO and thereby the cooperation between US and 
EU. The argument was that NATO would become redundant (Johnson, 2008). Recently 
however, there has been a change in how the US views EU, now more than ever because 
its own capabilities have become overstretched, i.e. Iraq, Afghanistan etc., and its 
attention has shifted to the rise of China. The EU was expected by the US to be capable 
of reconciling its hard power with its soft power to use in its own neighbourhood 
(Dempsey, 2008).  
 
5.3.2 The American reluctance in the Libya crisis 
Europe has to increase its hard power capabilities, by increasing military budgets. At a EP 
committee meeting on security and defence regarding the handling of Libya, the NATO 
major general Marcel Druart addressed the committee, and stated that the EU could not 
have done the mission in Libya without America. The EU have relied heavily on U.S. 
military expertise in intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, as some of the MS 
who was part of the coalition showed a limited will and capability in helping to achieve 
76 
 
the missions goals (Nielsen, 2012). Former American Defence Secretary Robert Gates 
points out how Libya showed the limits of Europe’s military power, and how this limited 
capability poses a threat to western security (SDA, 2011). This critique concerns the lack 
of European activism to crises in the MS’ own backyard. The Libya example also shows 
a growing reluctance from the US to get involved and take charge in contrast to before. It 
further indicates that the US in the future wants a more supportive role rather than a 
leading role in European security matters (The Economist, 2011). 
 Summary 
As Hill stated in 1993, the US had an increasing expectation of EU being able to take 
care of its own backyard. 20 years later, this expectation has not changed but only 
increased; the US still wants EU or the European countries to be able to carry out 
Western interest in its own neighbouring regions. This increased expectation is now 
beginning to show its consequences, as exemplified in the US reluctance to taking a lead 
role in the Libya crisis.   
 
5.4 Capabilities 
Now that the contemporary expectations have been outlined, the actual capabilities of the 
EU are discussed. The conclusions of the first analysis serve as the main arguments, 
when describing the three capabilities; the operational capacity, the internal resources and 
the ability to agree.  
5.4.1 Operational capacity 
The EU’s power to act rapidly in security crises, as analysed in the first analysis, has gone 
through a major change since the LT. As discussed, the capability of acting on security 
matters, seem to have better terms in regards to a more united and comprehensive 
approach, which is a result of the consolidation of the diplomacy and military institutions 
as established with the LT. The Crisis Platform gives the ability to react to a certain 
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individual crisis with the full power of the EU, which for instance created a successful 
platform in Libya. The option to conduct a military mission from within the EU 
framework, with the deployment of Battlegroups, gives the European Council the ability 
to act as EU, and not only as MS. At the same time the ability to sanction has been 
enhanced, as the transaction cost has been reduced, so the sanctions can be used as a 
resolute response to a certain crisis, as in the example of Iran.  
 Summary 
The expectation of the EU acting with a strong united approach does seem justified. The 
LT and the new hard power measures, has in theory given the EU the ability to react 
autonomously without the need for NATO. An obvious fact, as seen in the Iran example 
and the numerous military operations actually conducted with the operational command 
in the EU, is that some of these measures work when needed. 
However, since the EU has not used its Battlegroups or directly intervened under the EU-
flag post-Lisbon, it is hard to determine how all of the new measures and institutions 
would function together in a crisis situation. As concluded in the first analysis however, 
the Crisis Platform is only mandated to launch rapid response strategies, when the 
European Council unanimously agrees. As a result of this ad-hoc basis, the whole process 
seems to be slower than within a MS or NATO regime. However, evidence seems to 
suggest, that it is mainly the slow and inconsistent process of actually agreeing that is at 
fault here. Because, the actual operational capacity, with all of the implementation 
problems and turf war, appears to have been greatly improved since the implementation 
of the LT. However, the operational capacity is still, and as in the case of sanctions even 
more so, conditioned on the unanimity of the European Council.  
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5.5 Internal resources   
To understand the EU’s military capabilities it is important to look at its internal 
resources, this in regards to budget size, Battlegroup size and general spending. The 
overall EU military spending has decreased in the last couple of years, this is because of 
the Euro crisis, the end of the cold war and other factors, this in a time where, as 
mentioned before, the US is shifting its focus away from Europe (Rettman, 2012).  
The overall spending budget of the European countries has decreased significantly during 
the last couple of years. The Commission has stated that the overall budget fell from 
around 251 billion euro in 2001 to about 194 billion euro in 2010 and this, as described, 
in a time where expectations for a more interventionist role of the EU on the regional 
scene is increasing. The Commission states that the problem is in too different army 
types, too little research and development in new technology, and a lacking of 
standardized weapons systems as prime concerns (European Commission, 2013).  
As noted earlier, there is a critique from the US of the shrinking European military 
spending. Analysts in the US and in NATO criticize that only two countries in Europe 
spend the suggested 2 % of GDP on defence. These spending cuts and overall problems 
in military capacity have led US officials to say the EU would not by itself be able to 
conduct operations like Libya (Erlanger, 2013). 
 
5.5.1 European Defence Agency 
One way the EU has tried to counter the budget cuts and problems with the different 
army types and too little R and D is the European Defence Agency, which was developed 
in 2004.  
The idea behind the EDA was to strengthen the development, and cooperation between 
the different MS armies in accordance with the CSDP (European Defence Agency, 
2013a). This cooperation in military R and D, and cohesiveness in military armament, has 
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led to a higher expectation of a more common army. One of the important functions of 
the EDA is to support the MS in the improving of their military capabilities, by 
highlighting each individual MS shortcomings in military capacity. The purpose was to 
ensure that the MS had the sufficient abilities and capabilities to engage in contemporary 
and future crises and conflicts (European Defence Agency, 2013b).  
Another function of the EDA, is its help to MS in regards to military pooling and sharing, 
which helps the MS coordinate and share logistic capabilities. As an example the 
logistical gap was found during the Libya crisis, which has led to MS wanting to pool and 
share air-refuelling capacities (European Defence Agency, 2013c). This shows that the 
EU has an increased awareness of the importance of military cooperation regarding 
resources. Even when it comes to cooperation with NATO the EDA is praised as a means 
and a resource to combine strategic investments in new capabilities (Nato.int, 2010). 
Military resources 
Still, in regards to military resources, the EU still lacks proper investments and attention. 
In the framework for the Battlegroups, for instance, there were supposed to be two 
Battlegroups at the ready at any given time, but currently only one is active (The 
Economist, 2013b).  
Furthermore, top military officials inside the EUs military committee have criticized 
some European countries for not, with the current trend in spending, being able to field 
proper air forces in the near future (Reuters, 2012). 
Summary 
The capabilities to promote more efficient military spending are in place, but there is 
shown to be a general lack of willingness in military spending both at national level. The 
EU therefore tries to promote smart defence and pooling of resources to diminish the lack 
in the overall capacity of a unified European response to unforeseen crises. 
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5.6 Ability to agree 
As outlined, the role of the HR and EEAS, have led to a closer relation between the 
experts and the bureaucratic system of EU and the MS. The position of the HR has the 
ability to make a strong stand, use agenda setting power and theoretically, unite the 
divided MS into a compromise of the EU’s position. This is also the expectation to the 
position. 
Therefore, the improvement of the CFSP and the creation of the HR and EEAS have 
increased the operational capacity, but also raised the expectations to the ability to agree. 
At the same time the LT has not made the decision of defence a supranational one. It is 
still a reflection of the willingness of the MS. This willingness seems to differ much 
when looking at the two operational capabilities, military action and sanctions.  
5.6.1 Libya 
As previously mentioned, Libya was the first real security crisis for the EU after 
Afghanistan and Iraq, and would thus become a proving ground for the new CFSP 
policies. In many ways it can be seen as a critical junction since the new institutions and 
policy procedures would be tested and defined through their actions. 
As the Libya crisis began to get international attention, the EU took the lead. German 
Chancellor Angela Merkel threatened with sanctions as early as the 22nd of February 
2011. Three days later the MS agreed to impose sanctions, which were formally agreed 
upon by the Council on the 28th of February 2011 (Express, 2011).   
It is worth noticing that the EU announced their sanctions as fast as the US and prior to 
the UN, especially because European Council was not united in applying these sanctions 
in the beginning, as Italy, Greece and Malta objected 
(Times of Malta, 2011). These countries refused to endorse sanctions against Libya, since 
Muammar Gaddafi had been their long-termed trade partner, and most importantly had 
helped suppress the migrant flow from North Africa (Howorth, 2013). But with 
81 
 
negotiations these challenges were overcome, as the European Council agreed on 
sanctioning shortly after. This is another clear sign of the lowered transaction cost, that 
the reformations of the LT have caused in regards to sanctioning.  
The division of the MS, when a joint English-French proposition of a no-fly zone 
emerged, was however far more substantial.   
France and UK declared early their commitment to create a no-fly zone over Libya, 
which they presented to the EU president Van Rompuy just before the extraordinary EU 
summit of the European Council on the 11th March 2011, which would discuss the 
situation in Libya and result in a common statement (Lemoine & Malhére, 2011). 
  
Germany, along with a number of MS, on the other hand disagreed about a no-fly zone. 
They disagreed about the strategy itself, but more importantly also of the proper role of 
the EU. UK did, by all accounts, want a united EU in this instance, but did not have the 
expectations of EU being the leading military actor. UK wanted the operation to be 
executed by NATO, as Cameron at the time stated: 
 
  "Of course the EU is not a military alliance and I don't want it to be a military alliance. 
Our alliance is NATO."  (Traynor & Watt, 2011).  
 
And his Secretary of Defence Liam Fox stated;  
 
“Let me tell you, Europe already has a guarantor of its defence – it’s called NATO.” 
(Ames, 2011).  
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France on the other hand, with its NATO scepticism, wanted the no-fly zone to be carried 
out under the blue and yellow flag, they had the expectations of EU being the main 
coalition, with France (and UK) in the lead (Aims, 2011) (Dempsey, 2011).  
Instead, it confirmed their worst fears; that their European partners did not share the same 
expectations or ambitions, and they subsequently, pressured by the UK, agreed to conduct 
the mission under NATO with needed American help.  
Germany did not share this ambition and had great difficulties in accepting that the EU 
should take a military role in the conflict. They firmly declined any military involvement 
conducted from within the EU framework.  
Germany also abstained from voting at the UN resolution that would secure the no-fly 
zone, and made it clear that German troops would not participate in any form of military 
action in Libya (Reuters, 2011). This seems to indicate that Germany was more against 
the strategy than EU being the main military actor.  
 
5.6.2 Libya and EU 
Two main points are important to define in regards to the Libya crisis. Firstly, the EU’s 
successful overcoming different national interests in enforcing sanctions, and secondly 
their lack of success to form a common approach in regards to military action.  
The ability to agree and conquer differences in regards to sanctioning, is built on a 
foundation of successful and quickly implemented sanctions in conflicts with security 
implications. Iran is a point of reference in that regard. In the example of Libya, the EU 
was capable of taking rapid action, in the implementation of sanctions.  
However, in regards to military actions the division was clear.  
The Big Three’s cooperation had created the promising phrases, idealistic propositions 
and improvement of the EU’s operational capacity, but when a “backyard” security crisis 
emerged, they disagreed. They fulfilled their traditional roles as defined: France wanted 
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the EU to take military action, UK wanted NATO to be in charge and Germany did not 
want any involvement in a military process. This had the consequence that they were 
incapable of agreeing, and discussions about activating the necessary measures, as the 
Battlegroups or the Crisis Platform in an initial intervention, never came. This pursuit of 
their own agendas is understandable when seen in the light of rational institutionalism, as 
the rational self-serving actors they are, but it fails to answer why they created the 
capabilities to begin with if they have no desire to compromise. 
The importance of the conflict of Libya cannot be overstated, as it seems to be exactly the 
kind of conflict that CFSP was expected to carry out. For several years the MS made new 
initiatives concerned with just such a conflict; a regional conflict with a UN mandated 
call for intervention, and security implications for Europe, that the US did not initially 
want to take a leading role in. This match both the internal and external expectations of 
the EU, and it did not live up to these expectations. The disappointment was profound, 
due to the great expectations to the EU’s ability to actually make use of these new 
operational capabilities; their ability to agree.  
The expectations to the HR Ashton were that she should be the voice of a united EU, and 
make the MS reach a common decision and approach. These expectations were not 
fulfilled. The indecisiveness of the EU was as clear as ever, and brought back memories 
of the Yugoslavian crisis 20 years prior, and much seemed to have been blamed on 
Ashton’s lack of action. When looking at the subsequent critique of the EU following the 
Libya crisis, it is evident that Ashton did not live up to the great expectations of to her 
role as HR. 
 
The EP criticized her heavily. They had expected that she would have taken the lead, set 
the agenda and represent the EU. Instead, as France and UK proposed the no-fly zone 
plan, she did not make her opinion clear. Many EP’s openly expressed their deep concern 
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and disappointment with the HR, as she had allowed the MS to take the lead agenda 
setting role, while remaining passive herself (Helwig, Ivan & Kostnayan, 2013). Some 
EU-officials even described the handling of the Libya crisis as “...CFSP died in Libya” 
(Menon, 2011).  
The main criticism has been in line with this, defined as lacking of ambitions and 
leadership by the HR (Dover, 2013:251).  The Belgian Foreign Minister Steven 
Vanackere sums the critique up in an interview to the Belgian newspaper Le Soir in May 
2011, where he let it be understood that without a strong HR, it will be up to the Big 
Three to define the EU foreign security position: 
 
 "We have always wanted the External Action Service to be the central axis around which 
member states might organise, [...] But in the absence of a central player that reacts, 
makes analyses and conclusions quickly, it is the Germans today, the French tomorrow or 
the English who take up this role. The result is centrifugal, not centripetal” 
(Waterfield, 2011). 
Summary 
The expectations to the MS’s ability to agree have not been satisfied. The improvements to 
CFSP after the LT has lead to an increase in expectations due to the increase capabilities. 
However, the the new policy framework can still be paralysed by a disagreement between 
leading MS. As long as there is consensus between the leading MS, as was the case with 
the sanctions against Libya, the new institutions runs smoothly, but when disagreements 
arise, like the split between the Big Three over the no-fly zone, the new institutions of the 
CFSP grinds to a halt. Many actors expected the HR to assist in such situations to break 
the deadlock, when this did not happen the she received a lot of critique for her lack of 
leadership and action, and many actors stated that she had failed to live up to the mandate 
given to her.  
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5.7 Part Conclusion 
In this analysis, the expectations post-Lisbon was first outlined and analysed. Firstly, the 
internal expectations had increased as a clear result of the institutional developments of 
the CFSP. This made way for a rhetoric that almost declared the creation of an 
autonomous European Foreign Minister and a Union with military capabilities associated 
with statehood i.e. Battlegroups. At the same time the US expected more capability of the 
EU, as their attention and resources increasingly went elsewhere. This expectation seem 
to somehow be the same as in 1993, but increased and with serious consequences, as 
obvious in their reluctant position in the Libya crisis.  
In the analysis of the three capabilities, a change is apparent. In terms of the EU’s actual 
operational capability, there seem to be a major improvement since 1993. Especially the 
creation of CDSP, the Battlegroups, HR and EEAS are improvements, which gives the 
impression that EU are capable of reacting fast, if they are given the mandate from the 
European Council. Therefore, the expectations of EU acting on its own, without 
necessarily other actors involved, seemed to be in line with the actual operational 
capability.  
In terms of the internal capability, the institutional capacity has certainly improved with 
the EDA. The MS military spending however have diminished, and is in that aspect not 
in line with the demands from especially the US. However, this gap seems to be more 
directed at the MS than at the EU as a whole, because the do it separately from the EU.  
It is however hard to determine the full capacity of the EU, as it has yet to be activated, as 
a result of the MS seeming inability to agree.  
As obvious in the conflict of Libya, the idealistic rhetoric, the ambitious strategies and 
the expensive creation of the Battlegroups, are all for nought when faced with a real 
security crisis. The division between the MS was obvious, and displayed that the Big 
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Three’s traditional expectations to the EU as a military power was unchanged, also on 
this side of Lisbon. In the first real security challenge after Lisbon, the EU failed 
miserably, because EUs capability to act in precisely this kind of conflicts had been 
talked up, both with the rhetoric and the actual improvements of operational capacity. The 
expectation to the HR has been especially high, and as the division became obvious, 
many blamed her for being too passive and letting the MS set the agenda.  
Therefore, as analysed a capability-expectation gap still seems to exist. It has though 
narrowed, or maybe even closed in the case of operational capacity and to some extend in 
internal resources. However, the gap seems to be presented and maybe even wider than in 
1993 in the MS ability to agree, because of the increased expectations of unity following 
the creation of the HR, and the MS seemingly irreconcilable attitudes. This gap can be 
split into two parts, and their existence and justification are then analysed in chapter 5 in 
regards to the Mali crisis.  
* Capability-expectation gap between the internal and expectations to EU being a 
military power and the Member States willingness to this.  
* Capability-expectation gap of the High Representative ability to unite the Member 
States. 
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CHAPTER 6 
Analysis (III) 
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6. (III) The Mali case 
 
- Does this new capability-expectations gap show in the EU’s handling of the Mali 
Crisis? 
 
5 Analysis of the Mali case 
In this chapter an analysis is given of the Mali crisis to determine what happened and 
what the EU did. This is used in regards to the EU implemented Sahel strategy in order to 
further ascertain if EU lived up to its own expectations and if there is a gap between these 
and the actual reality of what capabilities the EU have.  
6.1 Mali crisis 
In this section a chronological overview is presented, containing the important moments 
in the Mali crisis from February 2012 up until the preliminary peace treaty and elections 
in November 2013. This is to help give a more clear idea about the situation in which the 
EU acted in, and to elaborate why it was a security issue for the EU as a whole. 
6.1.1 Historical timeline 
Mali was, prior to February 2012, a state which was in many ways was known for its 
relatively stable democracy, despite being in a part of Africa known for its instability. The 
main threat to the country has been and still is the increasing influence of Al-Qaeda and 
the Tuaregs separatist movements. Historically there have been a lot of skirmishes 
between the Government and the Tuareg minorities. But these skirmishes have been of 
minor size and primarily concerned the rule of law between the state and the northern 
region. Nevertheless in these skirmishes the balance has always been in favour of the 
Mali army (BBC News, 2013d). 
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However this radically changed with the fall of Colonel Gadhafi, which led to an influx 
of former Tuareg mercenaries coming back to Mali - heavily armed and well trained. In 
under a month the newly Formed Tuareg “Mouvement National Pour la Libération de 
l’Azawad” (MNLA), and its Islamic allies led a successful campaign against the poorly 
equipped and trained Mali military.  
Nossiter, 2012c). 
By the 22nd of March 2012, the Mali military, in response to the governments’ poor 
handling of the campaign against the Tuareg insurgence, overthrew the democratically 
elected government. An act, condemned by the UN, which led to further instability in the 
country and gave further momentum to the MNLA. (Nossiter, 2012c).  
By the 5th of April 2012, The Asawad region was fully occupied by the MNLA. This led 
to a halt in their campaign, and they made a Declaration of independence from Mali. This 
declaration was rejected by the African union and EU, because of fear for a spill over into 
other countries with Tuareg minorities (Al Arabiya, 2012). Then on the 15th of July 2012, 
Fighting erupted between Tuareg rebels on one side and the Islamist movements Ansar 
Dine, Al-Qaida in Maghreb (AQIM) and Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa 
(MUJAO) on the other. This was because the Islamist wanted to impose sharia law in all 
of Mali, where instead the MNLA wanted a secular independent state. The fundamentalist 
took control of most of the area in the north and imposed a strict form of sharia which led 
to a big migration of refugees from Mali. In the same period the fundamentalist 
movements slowly began their advance into south-western Mali (Nossiter, 2012a). 
Because of internal problems in the Mali government there was a second coup of the 
newly appointed transitional government on the 11th of December 2012. This led to even 
further instability and fear of no outside help in the rapidly worsening conflict. The coup 
this time happened because of an internal power struggle between the civilian and 
military government (Tinti, 2012). However in December 2012, the UN Security Council 
Resolution 2085 was passed. This created the framework for an African led support 
mission, African Internationally Led Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA), with soldiers 
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from all the Economic union of West Africa’s (ECOWAS) countries, but it was not ready 
to be deployed before 2013 (UN Security Council, 2012). However with the situation in 
Mali deteriorating quickly and the UNSC expressing concerns about the situation and 
urging countries involved in AFISMA to speed up deployment. (UN News Center, 2013). 
On the 11th of January 2013, the Mali government called for military support from 
France because Islamic rebels had captured the strategic city of Konna. The currently 
ongoing Operation Sérval lead by French forces was activated and airstrikes began the 
same day. Forces where not supposed to deploy until later, but because of the 
deteriorating situation they were deployed quickly. It was noted that the deployment of 
French forces were also supported by ECOWAS and the African Union (AU). AFISMA 
forces were also deployed to support the French troops (The Telegraph, 2013).  
The 17th of Jan 2013, the European Council established a European Military Training 
Mission (EUTM) in Mali. The proposal was made by the EEAS and HR Ashton. (EUR-
LEX, 2013) 
On the 15th of February 2013 there was an international donor conference headed by the 
EU that mobilized 3,25 billion Euro in an aid deal to Mali. These donations came with 
the price that Mali would return to a normal functioning democracy. (EU-LEX, 2013) 
On the 18th of June 2013, after months of campaigning the Tuareg and fundamentalist 
movements were pushed out of most of Northern Mali. Preliminary peace talks, where 
completed with the non-terrorist elements of the rebel factions. EU with HR Ashton in 
the front provided aid and assistance during the finalization of the peace agreement. 
Important strategic points and cities like Kidal in northern Mali were returned to 
government control. (Toornstra, 2013). 
On the 1st of July 2013, the UN Deployed the Peace keeping forces, The United Nations 
Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), it was deployed 
in Mali with the mandate of maintaining stability and rule of law. It took over the 
objectives and mission from AFISMA. The force was not deployed to counter insurgents, 
and French troops were still needed to support the mission in combating the islamists 
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threats (BBC News, 2013c). 
On 29th of July 2013, the first rounds of elections where held in order to get a new 
democratically elected president. These elections were praised as credible and transparent 
by HR Ashton, who with assistance of the EU oversaw the elections. (The Guardian, 
2013). 
On the 26th of September 2013, parts of the rebel movements suspended peace talks on 
grounds that the Tuareg minorities where still marginalised (Reuters, 2013). Further 
instability followed and on the 29th of September 2013 - Six civilians were killed in a 
suicide attack, in Kidal, in response to the suspended peace talks. This was in stark 
contrast to what the French president Hollande had declared just days before, a 
declaration that the war on terror was won in Mali. This showed that the Northern 
provinces where still threatened by fragility and instability. On the 24th of October 2013, 
Two UN peacekeeping soldiers from Chad died in a suicide bomber explosion, which 
was linked to Al-Qaeda (Aljazeera, 2013). In response to these attacks a combined force 
of French, UN and Mali soldiers began, on the 25th of October 2013, a massive counter-
insurgence campaign in the northern part of the country in an attempt to reduce terrorist 
activity (Rubin, 2013). On the 6th of November 2013, two French journalists, abducted in 
Kidal, were killed by Islamic insurgents in a response to the French “crusade” in the 
region. But despite of all the threats, parliamentary elections were still held all over Mali, 
on the 24th of November 2013, Even though there were security problems in the northern 
region (BBC News, 2013b).  
This highlights that the situation in Mali could have deteriorated to a point, where it could 
have effectively destabilized the region and that this could have an impact on Europe as a 
whole. This important factor would seem to determine that it was a crisis that was 
important to all of EU. 
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6.2 The Sahel Strategy & internal expectations 
In this section the Sahel strategy will be outlined, and analysed in order to find the 
internal and the external expectations in regards to the EU. This will help determine if 
there are differences between the internal and external expectations and between the 
member states in general. 
6.2.1 The Strategy for Security and Development in Sahel 
The Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel is the EEAS's outline of the 
Sahel region's problems and needs, and a plan for tackling these. The strategy was 
adopted by the FAC in March 2011. The strategy focuses on three core-Sahelian states, 
Mauritania, Mali and Niger, as well as how their development and challenges affect their 
neighbouring countries in the region. 
It specifies that while the Sahel regions stability has a great impact on neighbouring 
regions, the neighbour region of Maghreb, containing countries such as Libya, Algeria, 
Morocco and Nigeria, also has a great influence over the development of Sahel countries. 
It recognizes that the fate of all countries in the region is intertwined, in terms of 
development and security (The Sahel Strategy, 2011:1).  
The Sahel region 
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(Map of the Sahel Region - Sahel strategy 2011:2) 
The strategy outlines some of the reasons for why the EU has taken an interest in the 
regions development. Sahel being a region in Northern Africa means that immigration 
towards the EU is a major concern, and the strategy outlines how poverty and political 
instability can result in uncontrolled migratory flow. The security threat of AQIM which 
has operations in Northern Mali is also mentioned as a great concern, and a reason for 
why the EU should help secure and develop the region, as combating terrorism close to 
the EU soil should be of a priority(EEAS, 2013:f). 
The combating of radicalized elements is also mention as a challenge that needs to be 
overcome, as security and safety during delivery of humanitarian assistance and 
development aid must be prioritized. The Sahel strategy recognizes the security threat an 
unstable region poses to the EU, and therefore proposes a framework for coordination of 
the EU's current and future engagements in the region. This with the common purpose of 
strengthening the security and development in the region, which in turn strengthens EU's 
own security.  
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The strategy is based upon prior cooperation strategies under the European Development 
Fund (EDF), which had a focus similar to the Sahel strategy, and in the case of Mali, 
focused on the financial development, and fighting terrorism and organized crime(The 
Sahel Strategy, 2011:6). 
6.2.2 Partners  
The Sahel strategy draws upon the idea of cooperating with other institutions in the 
region, in working together towards a common goal of security and development. 
ECOWAS especially is mentioned here, as the organization has a better local 
understanding and already has an active plan for promoting good Governance, Peace and 
Security in the region. Likewise, the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) plays an 
active role in the Sahel region, actively cooperating with local authorities towards the 
enforcement of drug related laws (The Sahel Strategy, 2011:6).  
6.2.3 Strategy 
The deteriorating situation in the Sahel region urged the European Council to take a 
greater interest in the region; this began in October 2010 but was expanded in 2011 after 
the Libya crisis worsened the situation. The concrete strategy was discussed on a Council 
of ministers of Foreign affairs, where they: 
 
“…put forward the need for enhanced cooperation at all levels, and improved capacity 
building of state institutions. They also considered putting in place an action plan to fight 
against violent extremism, terrorism and organised crime. 
The strategy proposed by the EEAS was finally agreed upon on the 22th of September, 
although not all member states where enthusiastic about a stronger involvement in North 
Africa” (Rouppert, 2012). 
The strategy outlines the four greatest challenges identified in the region:  
1. Development, good governance and internal conflict resolution 
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2. Political & diplomatic 
3. Security & rule of law 
4. Countering violent extremism  
(EEAS, 2013:f) 
It is developed around four lines of action to be taken, in regards to these challenges. 
1. Development, good governance and internal conflict resolution: to contribute to the 
general economic and social development in the Sahel; to encourage and support the 
internal political dialogue in the countries of the region in order to enable sustainable 
home-grown solutions to remaining social, political and ethnic tensions; enhance 
transparent and locally accountable governance, to promote institutional capacity; re-
establish and/or reinforce the administrative presence of the state, particularly in the 
north of Niger and Mali; to help create education and economic opportunities for local 
communities; to open up the regions affected by insecurity through key road and social 
infrastructures; and to mitigate the impact of climate change effects. 
2. Political and diplomatic: to promote a common vision and a strategy by the relevant 
countries, to tackle cross-border security threats and address development challenges 
through a sustained dialogue at the highest level; to engage with partners (including 
Maghreb countries, regional organizations and wider international community) on are 
enforced dialogue on security and development in the Sahel. 
3. Security and the rule of law: to strengthen the capacities of the security, law 
enforcement and the rule of law sectors to fight threats and handle terrorism and 
organized crime in a more efficient and specialized manner and link them to measures of 
good governance in order to ensure state control. 
4. Fight against and prevention of violent extremism and radicalisation: to help 
enhance the resilience of societies to counter extremism; to provide basic social services, 
economic and employment perspectives to the marginalised social groups, in particular 
the youth vulnerable to radicalization; to support the states and legitimate non-state 
actors in designing and implementing strategies and activities aiming at countering these 
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phenomena.(The Sahel Strategy, 2011:7-8). 
 
In connection to the fourth line of action, Fight against and prevention of violent 
extremism and radicalization, the strategy mentions that an anti-terrorism cell in Mali has 
been proposed earlier, but was never established. However on the 20th of April 2010, a 
joint military command was set up in Algeria, between Algeria, Niger, Mali and 
Mauritania, to coordinate operations against terrorist cells in the Sahel. This was 
followed, in September 2010, by a joint intelligence cell to monitor AQIM activities in 
the region. These operations were proposed by Algeria in 2009, and the EU encourages 
further initiatives, though the joint intelligence cell never produced any tangible results.  
6.2.5 The Sahel Strategy's perspectives 
The Sahel Strategy outlines a set of prospects for the hopes the EU has for the regions 
development, in terms of where, idealistically, the region should be in terms of 
development and security according to the Sahel Strategy. 
3 years perspective: improving access of populations in the contested zones to basic 
services(roads, livelihoods, education, social services) as well as to economic and 
education opportunities, while improving their relations with their parent states; reducing 
terrorist attacks and kidnappings in the Sahel countries, limiting the capabilities of AQIM 
and criminal networks, improving security in the contested zones of Sahel as States' 
administration and services redeploy effectively and are in line with the principles of 
good governance, while their security capabilities to fight terrorism and criminal 
trafficking across the region are improved; contributing to the fight against corruption, 
supporting the implementation of peace settlements, raising awareness and training the 
local traditional elites to better understand and react to the threats of terrorism and 
organised crime; increasing confidence between local and state authorities. 
5/10 years perspective: enhancing political stability, security, good governance, social 
cohesion in the Sahel states and economic and education opportunities, thus setting the 
conditions for local and national sustainable development so that the Sahel region can 
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prosper and no longer be a potential safe haven for AQIM and criminal networks; 
assisting at national level in mitigating internal tensions, including the challenges posed 
by violent extremism on which AQIM and other criminal groups feed.(The Sahel Strategy, 
2011:4) 
 
The Sahel Strategy, is a thorough guide for the EU's long term engagement in the region, 
which works through providing a broad framework from which to build, which again 
provides enough flexibility to allow for adjustments to the plan while sticking to it.  
This highly comprehensive strategy is a clear sign of the internal expectations that the EU 
institutions have for the EU’s role in the Sahel region, especially the EEAS is heavily 
involved in the formation and implementation of the strategy and thus has large 
expectation to EU’ role. The Council too has an expectation that the EU can contribute 
meaningfully to the stabilization of the region through the agreed upon strategy, however 
this institution is divided by the different interests of the MS. The call for a Sahel strategy 
was led by the southern MS, especially France and Spain (Rouppert, 2012:5), while the 
northern MS have fewer interests in North Africa and thus less motivation to be engaged 
in a stabilization effort in the region.  
6.2.6 EU interests in the Sahel 
As mentioned before, the EU has a great deal of interests in the Sahel region, both to 
secure the significant aid money already invested in the country, but also more 
geopolitical considerations play in. The proximity of the region makes MS vulnerable to 
large scale migration should humanitarian crises arise; this is especially a great concern 
for the southern MS due to the Dublin Regulation, which states that illegal immigrant are 
the responsibility of the MS which they first entered, thus burdening the southern 
countries unproportionally to the northern ones. Furthermore instability in the region 
could lead to the creation of a safe haven for terrorists, as noted above AQIM has a large 
presences in the area and is able to recruit from the population due to the widespread 
illiteracy and poverty which makes the population vulnerable to extremist propaganda 
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(Musilli & Smith, 2013). A safe haven for terrorists this close to Europe is naturally a 
grave concern for the MS, so far there have been no reported attacks on European 
countries from the AQIM, but western companies and persons in the Sahel region have 
been targeted for kidnapping and killing. These attacks is not only a source of security 
concerns, but also an economic problem since they are threatening the substantial 
European economic interests in the oil and mineral rich region, the terrorist attacks have 
discouraged many companies from continuing their operations in the region due to the 
security risks to their employees. This decision to limit operation in the Sahel region is 
not limited to companies, NGO and humanitarian organization have also pulled out of the 
region due to the security risks. This has in turn led to a worsening of the poverty and 
illiteracy in the region thus creating a self-reinforcing circle which strengthens the 
extremists (ibid.). The above mentioned reasons are all good arguments of why the EU 
should have a comprehensive strategy for solving the problems of the region through the 
use of a broad spectrum of tools.  
6.2.7 Summary 
The interests of the EU in Mali as an almost neighbouring country with large deposits of 
natural resources are comprehensive, and the political and economic investments of the 
Sahel strategy has not diminished these interests. However while all MS agreed to the 
strategy, the Sahel region is of far greater importance to the southern MS than the 
northern ones, this means that the fulfilment of the strategy is more vital to some than 
others, and the need to use extra resources like the deployment of combat troops in order 
to implement the strategy would most likely brings these latent conflicts between the MS 
out in the open. 
6.3 External expectations  
6.3.1 Mali 
With the adoption of the Sahel strategy the EU has committed itself to securing a stable, 
democratic Sahel region, especially the 4. Part of the strategy which stresses the 
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importance’s of combating terrorist groups, shows the EU involvement in the security of 
the region.  
So when Mali begged for immediate help from the international community in January 
2013 through the UN (RNW, 2012). 
 
 
"The government of Mali would like to see the immediate presence of this force to support 
the defence and security in carrying out their noble mission of recovering and 
maintaining territorial integrity and protecting persons and property,"Mali's prime 
ministerCheickModiboDiarra (Aljazeera, 2012).  
 
It was reasonable to expect the EU to spearhead the aid of the country, especially in light 
of other such cases in Africa like Congo, Chad, Darfur and Somalia where the EU has 
committed military assistance but with far less interests vested in the countries. However 
since the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan the Western nations have been very reluctant to 
participate in new military interventions without a clear goal, exit strategy and local 
support. It was unclear whether or not the MS would live up to the responsibilities 
imposed upon them by the strategy they themselves had agreed to.  
Apart from the expectations generated by the Sahel strategy the EU has a clear incentive 
to act in Mali in order to prevent a spill over into other countries of the Sahel and the 
Maghreb regions (Musilli & Smith, 2013) which could lead to a complete destabilization 
which would greatly hurt core EU interests, especially the oil and natural gas export of 
the region which is of vital importance’s to the EU. The Algerian natural gas export to EU 
alone consists of 15 % of the EU import, and while it is unlikely that the Algerian state 
itself could be threatened by the AQIM, as Mali is, it is however likely that the terrorist 
group could seriously disrupt the economic interests of the country and thus hurt the EU 
interests. The risk of escalation and spill over makes for another argument that the EU 
should act sooner rather than later in order to counter the extremists before their influence 
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spread and thus become more difficult to root out. At the very least Mali expected France 
to aid their former colony to combat the imminent threat and stabilize the situation, this 
arises from Frances’ own public statements about the importance of securing the region 
by force if necessary: 
 
“The situation created by the occupation of a territory in northern Mali by terrorist 
groups is intolerable, inadmissible and unacceptable, not only for Mali, who is directly 
affected by this terrorist evil, but for all the countries of the region and, beyond, for all 
those who may one day be the victims of terrorism. The authorities of Mali have just 
brought this matter before us. So there is no time to lose. France will support all 
initiatives that enable the Africans themselves to resolve this issue in accordance with 
international law, with a clear mandate from the Security Council. Yes, Mali must regain 
her territorial integrity and terrorism must be banished from the Sahel 
region.” (Hollande, 2012) 
 
Furthermore France previous willingness to intervene on the African continent both in 
cooperation with the international community, the EU and alone supports the notion that 
they would take the lead in any intervention (Schofield, 2013). The Mailan expectations 
for help from the EU have been a bit too high if they expected the EU as whole to follow 
through on the Sahel strategy, the only EU response has been the EUTM which is far 
from enough to stabilize the situation in Mali. However since the intervention from 
France has achieved the desired results Mali’s expectations have been satisfied. 
6.3.2 USA 
As explained earlier the US was initially against the CSDP because of concerns that a 
common European defence and security policy would weaken the NATO alliance. At the 
same time the US have doubts about the whether or not the EU or individual European 
states, are able to take care of their own security policy and stage interventions like the 
one in Mali on their own. 
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Nonetheless the US expected the EU countries to take care of the situation without 
American troops being deployed. (Frosch, 2013).  
This opinion shows that the US does not want to be as active in deploying US troops in 
the region as previously and simultaneously expects the EU to step up and handle 
situations in their own neighbourhood, as could also be observed in the intervention in 
Libya, which was mostly handled by the UK and France. It does not however matter for 
the US if the intervention is handled collectively by the EU or, as it happened, mostly by 
a single MS.  
6.3.3 Summary  
The extern expectations towards the EU’s role is generally quite high due to EU’s own 
statements prior to the crisis and the existing tools available to the EU. The US 
government in particular, expects the EU to deal with the problems it is own backyard 
without US support. As was seen in the case, this expectation is somewhat out of 
proportions with the EU’s actual capabilities. The EU has developed the institutional 
capabilities to solve the Mali crisis, however the MS ability to agree on a suitable 
approach is lacking and a united response to the terrorist threat is therefore unlikely. With 
Frances’ willingness to intervene on its own the crisis was still solved without the need 
for US involvement, but France might not in the future have the required resources to 
police the EU’s backyard. The same goes for Mali’s expectations to the EU which were 
not met.  
6.4 High Representative Catherine Ashton’s role in the Mali conflict. 
In this section an outline of the HR role in regards to the crisis in Mali is given, this is to 
find out if she lived up to the expectations to lead the EU response. Her ability to lead is 
important in order to understand if she was one of the problems, when it came to 
combining a cohesive and assertive response to the crisis. 
6.4.1 The High Representatives role in the Mali crisis 
The expectations of what role the HR and the EEAS need to fulfil has been rather vague 
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and split from the start, though the critique of Ashton as HR has been prominent 
throughout.  
When she was chosen as HR in 2009 by EU leaders, the choice was criticized by political 
observers everywhere, particularly on grounds of her low political profile, and lack of 
foreign affairs experience. She was referred to as being, “out of her depth” in her work of 
setting up the EEAS, by members of the EP(Der Spiegel International, 2010). 
Her handling of the EEAS in general has been criticized for being too top heavy, and 
hindered by having too many decision-making layers, and is marred by inability to act. 
 
“The EU finds itself still struggling to gain diplomatic influence. Employees within 
Ashton's own agency complain that the high representative is unable to delegate and has 
no political agenda” (Schult, 2013). 
 
The EP's Foreign Affairs Committee, has criticized HR Ashton’s abilities and handling of 
the EEAS, as well as the EEAS' abilities in general 
 
“she often reacts too late and allows EU member states to dictate her staffing policy. […] 
Operational decision-making and implementation in the area of the Common Foreign 
and Security Policy / Common Security and Defense Policy (CFSP/CSDP) are too slow 
because of structural and procedural reasons […] It has become apparent that the EU is 
unable to ensure, in short term, a reallocation of resources, including staff, to match new 
political priorities.” (Schult, 2013). 
HR Ashton’s own expectations to her role as HR seem to differ from what is expected of 
her by the EP. According to the LT, the EEAS is supposed to design a common EU 
foreign policy, but according to HR Ashton, that is neither possible nor its goal. 
“The EEAS is not a European foreign ministry designed to replace Member States' 
foreign ministries […] but rather something new and unique.”(Schult, 2013). 
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And while she has laid a general foundation for what the EEAS might be in the future, 
she has stated that she has done everything in her power for the EEAS and is resigning 
her position in 2014. She admitted that it is time for a shift in leadership. 
“There are people who can do things with this that probably I couldn't do, so it'll be good 
to hand it over” (Schult, 2013). 
 
She did recently receive some positive feedback for her role in the Iran nuclear 
negotiations, during which she was largely held responsible for bringing the involved 
parties to the negotiation table, and functioning as both a diplomat and negotiator (Mayr, 
2010).  
HR Ashton has, during the Mali conflict, been acting as the voice of the EU in regards to 
the handling of the situation. She has been involved in shifting the focus towards the 
conflict, as well as establishing means for resolving the situation. During the crisis, she 
has been engaged in the resolving of the conflict in several ways, and has acted on behalf 
of the EU on several occasions.  
On the 6th of February 2012, she expressed deep concern over the violent confrontations 
in Mali, which had been taking place since the 17th of January, and emphasised the 
commitment to securing territorial stability, as well as peace, democracy and stability 
across the region, in line with the Sahel strategy. She also urged those involved in the 
conflict to cease hostilities immediately, and commit to inclusive talks, which she would 
readily support through appropriate means. In emphasising her commitment to the 
resolution of the Mali conflict, she ensured the involved forces of the EU's commitment 
and support(Consilium, 2012:a).  
On the 7th of April 2012, she pledged the EU's full support for the efforts of ECOWAS to 
resolve the political crisis in Mali. This was in accordance with the initial plans from The 
Sahel strategy, and further emphasising the cooperation during the crisis, and EU's 
commitment to adhere to the initial plan(Consilium, 2012:b). On the 21st of December 
2012, the UNSC resolutions on Mali was welcomed by HR Ashton, and she expressed 
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her support of the resolutions plans to enforce Mali sovereignty and the need to address 
human rights and humanitarian relief concerns(Consilium, 2012:c). On the 11th of 
January 2013, she called for enhanced and accelerated international engagement in 
support of the restoration of stability and State authority in Mali, further increasing 
attention towards the problems(Consilium, 2013:a).  
This was further emphasised by her on the 15th of January 2013, where she again stated 
the EU's commitment to resolving the conflict in Mali, and stressed the need to act 
rapidly(Consilium, 2013:b). 
On the 18th of June 2013, she welcomed the signing of the preliminary peace agreement 
between the Mali authorities and northern Mali's non-terrorist armed groups(Consilium, 
2013:c). 
She has been acting as a mediator in the conflict, both bringing attention to the issues 
faced in Mali, as well as having tried to bring the conflicting parties to negotiations 
through statements, and the constant reminders of EU's commitment to ensuring peace, 
democracy and stability in the region. 
6.4.2 Summary 
The expectations of what Catherine Ashton’s role as HR entails, has been differing 
widely. With the EP expecting a “foreign minister” or at least something resembling that, 
the bar for what she needs to encompass, was raised very high. In terms of actually 
having the competences to fulfil such a role, the gap has been substantial. In order to 
fulfil the role as EU foreign minister, HR Ashton would need to have the full support of 
the MS in terms of making foreign policy decisions, something which simply is not 
possible in most cases, as the 28 MS often has different views on several aspects of 
foreign policy. HR Ashton acknowledges this fact, and has therefore had a different set of 
expectations regarding her role. She has been trying to define exactly what it entails, 
though without any conclusive result, while under constant criticism for not fulfilling the 
role as it was intended by the EP. 
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During the conflict in Mali, HR Ashton has been a continuous voice of the EU's concerns 
and action plans. She has been actively involved in promoting peace and in this regard 
helped pave the way for negotiations. By being the primary representative of the EU in 
the conflict, she has both internally within the EU, been able to argue the importance of 
resolving the Mali conflict, and simultaneously been able to promote the EU's initiatives 
towards the conflict area. Having one clear representative for the EU in the conflict, has 
made communication effective and clear, as all parties involved would know to whom 
and where they ought to direct their voices for it to be heard. She has acted as intended by 
the EP, as EU’s “foreign minister”.  
Her acting as what could be regarded as the foreign minister of the EU, somewhat clashes 
with what her own expectations towards what her role as HR entails, but matches the 
initial expectations of the EP to an extent, as she has been able to negotiate and act on 
EU's behalf, but without the actual competences to make decisions on the behalf of the 
EU. 
6.5 Analysis of Member States reactions to the crisis and the use of 
Battlegroups 
This section determines how different parts of the EU acted in regards to the crisis in 
Mali. How close did EU come to the idea of a combined EU intervention in Mali and 
whether the use of Battlegroups was ever part of the plan. This is used to determine if the 
expectations lived up to the political reality, and if there is an ability to agree. 
6.5.1 What are the individual actions/reactions of the Member States?  
To understand the actions of the EU and MS, one has to divide it into two parts, what the 
actors wanted to do before 2013 and what the actors wanted to do after 2013. This is 
because as stated in the historical overview (see section 6.1.1), the Islamic offensive into 
the south changed the situation and threatened the capital of Bamako and further 
increased the crisis. 
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6.5.1.1 The Big Three and the EP 
Before 2013 the French agenda was to set up a multilateral African led mission 
authorised by the UN, this mission would be supported by EU or French forces and 
financed in part by the EU. The terrorist threat was by all means a danger to the region 
and Europe and had to be stopped, in order to prevent Mali from becoming a failed state 
(The Economist, 2013a). This is in accordance with the normal action of France when it 
comes to conflict solving, where France has historically been prone to use force and 
wanting to do this in an EU context.  
UK on the other hand was against any form of direct conflict in Mali, and did not want 
any direct combat role in the conflict. It was stated from British side that its government 
was planning to make a contribution to a CSDP mission, but that it would be a non-
combat mission. Another important factor for the British was that any form of 
intervention would be made by ECOWAS (Bacchi, 2012). UK’s role in the case of Mali 
was therefore a very passive one, which is an unusual position for the UK, especially 
because they were on the front in regards to an intervention in Libya. 
Germany was, in contrast to France, a bit sceptical about an intervention in Mali, and in 
the political climate in Germany there was even a significant resistance to supporting a 
training mission. Germany weighted its options and made sure it would not lead to an 
armed conflict with German soldiers on the frontline. However the German government 
was preparing to support a EUTM (Knaup, Repinski & Schult, 2012). This shows that the 
German government was very conservative in regards to participating in the conflict. The 
German foreign minister even stated: 
 
"We cannot allow terrorism to take root in an area beyond all lawful control in northern 
Mali," said German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle, who stressed that the mission 
would not take the form of boots on the ground. "African leadership is key," he said. "The 
point is not that we deploy combat troops."  (Der Spiegel International, 2012). 
Which is very much in line with what is usually expected of Germany, and it further 
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underpins why a combined EU military intervention was not a possibility, even though 
their threat assessment was in line with the rest of the MS. 
Inside the EU’s institutions the EP was very active in its recommendations and in its 
expectations to the use of EU crisis instruments. In the EP resolution on Mali the 20th of 
April 2012, there was a call to look into the possibility of an ESDP mission with mandate 
from UNSC. The idea with this mission was to be able to provide logistical support and 
support in securing areas not in the hands of rebels (European Parliament, 2012a). 
However, in its resolution on the CSDP on the 22nd of November 2012 the EP criticised 
the lack of use of the Battlegroups in regards to Libya and Mali, and called for ongoing 
planning of military operations. The EP also called for more MS to use existing means in 
order to make their capabilities available to form EU Battlegroups or to help in joint 
missions. The EP emphasised the nature of the threat posed towards the EU in the Sahel 
and urged the Council and the HR to fully implement the Sahel strategy, by giving 
resources to CSDP (European Parliament, 2012b). This shows that from inside the EP 
there was an expectation that more could have been done by the EU, in regards to the 
crisis.  
3.5.1.2 The process of forming the EUTM 
The process of a EUTM was formed inside the Council over a couple of months. The 
mission would be similar to the one done in Somalia and would be a training mission of 
Mali’s own military. The draft was agreed upon on the 12th of October 2012 (Der Spiegel 
International, 2012). It was stated that in regards to a mission in Mali three options were 
finalized, within the framework of the EU. The Options ranged from either helping in 
reforming and training military staff like in Congo, a regular EUTM, or the EUTM+, 
which was the most controversial proposal in that it suggested EU forces helping Mali 
units on the frontline after training completions, but the forces would still not be directly 
engaged in the conflict. However, an EEAS expert stated that a EUTM+ mission was 
probably unrealistic because the MS wanted to minimize risks to its soldiers, and that 
these kinds of missions have limited effect (Knaup, Repinski & Shult, 2012). On the 19th 
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of November there was a final agreement on what kind of military intervention/support 
the EU would provide. The proposal drafted by the EEAS about a EUTM was agreed 
upon by FAC. This was done in an effort to help Mali regain it lost territory. 
Simultaneously the EU pledged itself to contribute humanitarian and development aid to 
help Mali (Gardner, 2012).  
This showed that an intervention in the form of Battlegroups was not on the table, a least 
not in the more official parts of the negotiations. Though there was an agreement on the 
threat assessment, most of the MS were not ready to see EU forces in direct engagements. 
6.5.2 The reactions of the Big Three and EU after 2013 
As stated earlier, the crisis in Mali escalated in 2013 which led to a direct plea from the 
Mali government to France for help, this led to the French active intervention on the 11th 
of January 2013.  
6.5.2.1 What did the Big Three and EU do? 
France stated that it had decided to act because it could not wait any longer. The French 
intervention came because the African led mission was taking too long, and the Mali 
capital was in danger (The Economist, 2013a). With France spearheading the offensive, it 
is currently the most active foreign power in Mali, with leadership of both operation 
Serval and the EUTM (EEAS, 2013I). However France criticised the hesitation from 
other MS which did not contribute enough to the Mali mission. Therefore because of this 
isolation, the French president Hollande sought help in the Gulf States, for financial 
backing (Lichfield, 2013). The option of using Battlegroups was never part of France’s 
plan and besides help from the Gulf States, it also sought to use the African nations in 
support of its operations (Gowan, 2013). It can be noted here, that part of the French 
military command was actually against the use of Battlegroups in Mali. The argument 
was that a unilateral campaign led by France alone would be more efficient than a 
multilateral military campaign (Rettman, 2013).  
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3.5.2.2 How did the Member States support the French operation in Mali?  
Soon after the French led intervention in Mali, the EU came out and declared it full 
support to France and pledged to activate its EUTM and send foreign aid and funding to 
the African led intervention force. Besides the EUTM, some of the MS also pledged 
logistical troop support to France. An EU-official stated that the reason to still go ahead 
with the EUTM, was that Mali still needed an efficient army under civilian control, but 
that the mission would have no combat role. Funds were also made available from the EU 
if the Mali government could speed up its efforts to re-establish democracy, funds that 
had been taken away during the first military coup (EU Business, 2013). The UK reacted 
to the French intervention with acknowledgment and support. However the UK would 
only provide logistical support (BBC News, 2013a). Within the EU framework the UK 
committed its troops to the training mission, but it was again stated that the role of British 
troops would not be that of combat (Ross, 2013). When the crisis peaked, Germany also 
stated its support to the French led intervention, but they concluded that there would be 
no German boots on the ground in an offensive operation (Grässler, 2013). Besides being 
part of the EUTM Germany began offering logistic support as part of its presence in 
Mali, to support France in its operations (Diallo, 2013).  
6.5.3 Who wanted to use Battlegroups?  
General Patrick De Rousiers, who is HR Ashton’s military advisor stated that the 
Battlegroups were taken up in the initial planning phase of what to do after France had 
already intervened in Mali, but it decided against deploying them. It had been discussed 
with the chief of defence of each nations, but a draft was never put to voting in the 
Council. He also mentions that the Mali crisis called for a quick response and to deploy 
the Battlegroups would have taken to long and required an agreement from all 28 MS. 
The Battlegroups would have been an inadequate tool in the Mali case (Croft, 2013). One 
part of the institutions that was for the use of Battlegroups, in support of the French 
operation, was the EP security and defence subcommittee who were pro Battlegroups 
intervening in Mali. Inside the EP there was a critique of the EU for not living up to its 
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own strategy for the Sahel 2011, and being surprised of the escalation of the crisis despite 
clear warnings. Another critique was the lack of solidarity between MS, because while 
they did provide logistical support, the Battlegroups had not been activated (European 
Parliament, 2013).  
6.5.3 Summary 
There does not seem to be an ability to agree, especially when it comes to the use of 
Battlegroups in armed conflicts. With a divide between the Big Three; with the UK being 
against any form of action, Germany only wanting to do non-combat actions and lastly 
France, wanting a more assertive role for the EU. It becomes clear that the expectations 
to the use of Battlegroups were not a viable political option. This even though institutions 
like the EP, was very much in favour of doing an intervention in the frame of the EU, and 
that the capabilities to do such an intervention were there. The framework of CSDP crisis 
management does not seem to be able to solve the crisis, where actions are needed 
quickly and where there is disagreement between MS about the course of action. It shows 
that when it comes to boots on the ground the MS go back to a more traditionally reaction 
pattern, which seems to make it difficult to make a joint response. 
6.6 Part Conclusion 
There was no doubt that the crisis in Mali was a problem that could spill over and 
destabilize the whole region, which in turn could affect Europe. The region is of 
importance, and this has only increased with the Sahel strategy - a strategy all MS had 
agreed upon. Internally there was an expectation to be able to find a solution inside the 
existing framework, in the case of a crisis, using existing capabilities. This was due to all 
MS having agreed upon the strategy, even though the region is of differing importance to 
the MS. The external expectations towards the EU’s role were high, because of the added 
responsibility from the US, but also due to it now having the necessary operational 
capacity to solve a crisis like Mali. There was an expectation that the MS would be able 
to agree upon a common approach, and the failure to reach a consensus led to a 
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capability-expectation gap. This shows that the ability to agree was absent in the case of 
Mali. The expectations to the HR were high both internally and externally. The main 
problem was in the different perceptions of what the role of the HR entails. 
In order to act as a “Foreign minister” of the Union, she needs the full support of the MS, 
which is mostly not the case. As a mediator between the MS in order to reach a common 
acceptable goal, the expectations have also been high. A gap, that she acknowledges 
herself and has been trying to minimize by lowering the expectations, without much 
effect as she is still being criticized for not doing enough. In regards to the Mali crisis she 
has tried to be the primary representative, and active in promoting peace in the region, 
this in the role of external representative of the Union. This matches some of the initial 
expectations, but in the role as a mediator between MS, in regards to a more active 
foreign policy, there is clearly still a gap. When it comes to the MS there has been an 
expectation for them to be able to agree and act more decisive and coherent due to the 
increase in operational capacity. What the Mali case shows, is that a gap still remain, 
because the expectations are highlighted when the EP calls for use of the existing 
framework. The operational capabilities was in place, but the will to have boots on the 
ground was not, which showed that the political environment had returned to the 
traditional conflict between the Big Three. With no ability to agree and no joint 
intervention, this has led to the problem of a capability-expectation gap in regards to 
crisis in Mali. Instruments like Battlegroups are tailored for a crisis exactly like Mali, and 
they could have been deployed easily, if there had been an ability to agree. It can thus be 
concluded that the gaps identified in analysis two are also evident in the Mali case. 
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CHAPTER 7 
Analysis (IV) 
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7. (IV) Understanding these Expectations 
 
- Is this expectations gap a result of either too high expectations, or too low 
capabilities, and how can it be closed? 
 
In this section there will be a discussion about the gaps that have been identified. It is 
determined whether the expectations to the MS ability to agree and the HR’s ability to 
make them agree, are too high. 
7.1 Have the expectations, to the Member States ability to agree, been too high? 
As obvious from analysis (II) (III), there has been high expectations to the MS ability to 
agree on critical conflicts with security implications. The expectations have increased in a 
time where EU faced no rapid security challenges, and where the Big Three seemed to 
have reached a common understanding of a development of a common EU defence. The 
expectations increased especially because of the fact, that this was not only idealistic 
rhetoric of good intentions; it actually created an increased operational capacity, with a 
military and foreign dimension. The expectations of EU acting upon these have increased 
as a result, as obvious in the disappointment in the aftermath of the crises in Libya and 
Mali. To understand if these expectations are misplaced, one needs to look at three 
different factors, which have been discussed throughout this paper: The US increased 
reluctance, the CFSP’s purpose and the change of the political climate in the Big Three. 
US shifting attention 
As identified by Hill in 1993, and in analysis (II), the American expectation to EU has 
been paradoxical. They want the EU to handle their own backyard with an increased 
capability, but at the same time warned that an increase in military integration could have 
a negative impact on NATO. Nevertheless, they have the expectation that Europe should 
take care of conflicts with security implications for the European countries. As analysed 
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in the conflict of Libya and to a lesser extend in Mali, the consequences of these 
expectations now seem to translate into (in)action. 
The purpose of CDSP 
It cannot be overstated how much the Libya and Mali conflicts seem to be exactly the 
purpose for which the CDSP was created. Both were medium scale UN-mandated opera-
tions, which had security implications for Europe and with a reluctant US on the side-
line. As identified in analysis (II), this was exactly the kind of operation that CDSP itself 
identified as its purpose. If one for instance look at the EP's definition of the use of Bat-
tlegroups:  
“The Battlegroup Concepts consists of highly trained, battalion-size formations (1,500 
soldiers each) – including all combat and service support as well as deploy ability and 
sustain ability assets. These should be available within 15 days notice and sustainable for 
at least 30 days(extendable to 120 days by rotation). They should be flexible enough to 
promptly undertake operations in distant crises areas (i.e. failing states), under, but not 
exclusively, a UN mandate, and to conduct combat missions in an extremely hostile env i-
ronment (mountains, desert, jungle, etc.). As such, they should prepare the ground for 
larger, more traditional peacekeeping forces, ideally provided by the UN or the Member 
States. “ (European Parliament, 2006) 
All requirements seem to have been satisfied, but the MS could not agree, and the rapid 
action part of CDSP became useless.  
The political climate in the Big Three 
To understand the division between the Big Three in Libya and Mali, one need to under-
stand the changes there have been made in the political climate in the years, where the 
new hard-power measures and institutional development were created. 
France 
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As identified in analysis (II) (III), France lived up to their traditional role in both the Lib-
ya and Mali crises. They wanted both conflicts to be solved within the EU-regime, but 
with France as the lead country. This positive attitude towards EU as a global security 
actor was apparent under both President Jacque Chirac and Nicolas Sarkozy, as they were 
the original co-authors of all of the new measures described in analysis (I) (II). They 
wanted, for instance to create an operational headquarter to plan and manage EU mis-
sions, a proposal which was rejected mainly by the UK. (Spiegel. 2013).  
UK 
As outlined in analysis (II) the UK broke from their traditional scepticism towards a 
common European Defence, when they agreed with France about a common ground to 
develop a rapid action force as defined by the Headline Goal in 1999. Former Prime Min-
ister Tony Blair and his Labour government was perceived, by UK standards, as a very 
EU-positive administration (http://www.opendemocracy.net/tony_blair_and_europe.jsp). 
Blair's commitment to the United States as their strongest allied however, could not be 
questioned, especially after their entrance into the US-led coalition that was to invade 
Iraq (Grant, 2004:4). Blair argued that turning the EU into an operational force in a 
NATO-friendly direction, would be complementing NATO not diminishing its im-
portance (Grant, 2004:3f). Nevertheless the rhetoric was obviously positive, and the re-
sults were clear, as it was a joint French and British initiative to create the ESDP, and lat-
er the Battlegroup Concept: 
“Together we now propose that the EU should aim to build on this precedent so that it is 
able to respond through ESDP to future similar requests from the United Nations, wheth-
er in Africa or elsewhere. The EU should be capable and willing to deploy in an autono-
mous operation within 15 days to respond to a crisis.” (http://www.defense-
aerospace.com/article-view/verbatim/29324/defense-declaration-from-french_uk-
summit.html). 
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Tony Blair and his Labour government were however not thrilled about all of the new 
initiatives. He fought against France and Germany on the question of the power of the 
EEAS and HR, where the UK fought against the title “European Foreign Minister”, 
which was the original title of the HR (Carta & Whitman, 2013:144).  
But this seemingly positive attitude ended quickly when the new Conservative govern-
ment with David Cameron as Prime Minister took office. The self-announced Eurosceptic 
David Cameron (Hannan, 2013) and his government made it clear, as he did during the 
Libya crisis, that EU was not a military alliance and should never be. This was the begin-
ning of a lot of changes, where the UK tried to push back the influence of EEAS. As a 
rapport from European Policy Centre concludes;  
“Since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty and the change of government in London, 
the UK has pursued an overall ‘push back’ approach in all attempts to interpret the 
vague wording of the treaty against any expansion of the EEAS’s competences.” (Carta & 
Whitman, 2013:145).  
In the Libya and Mali crises it was obvious that this scepticism towards EU as a military 
alliance, stopped the UK from acting with the operational capacity improvement they 
themselves had helped create during the Blair administration. So, even though the Sahel 
Strategy was agreed on with the consent of UK, it was obvious that a move like activat-
ing the Battlegroups or intervening in an EU context seemed unrealistic. 
Germany 
In Libya and Mali, Germany made it clear, that it did not want any German soldiers par-
ticipating. Germany's reluctance to do this makes the prospect of presenting the EU as a 
global security actor sound hollow. However, the German positive attitude towards creat-
ing a European defence has been a fact, as obvious in the creation of several German Bat-
tlegroups and Chancellor Angela Merkel’s own ambition for a common European de-
fence with military capabilities in 2007 (Glover, 2007). As identified in Mali, Merkel 
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wanted to fulfilled a more progressive German role, and help with military assistance, but 
was quick to learn that her Parliament was not as keen to change the German traditional 
attitude of pacifism. In the aftermath to Mali, the same rhetoric was to be heard from the 
German Defence Minister Thomas de Maiziere, when he suggested that the Battlegroups 
should be used, and that Mali could have been a case for activating them (Hasselbach, 
2013). It seems that Germany has an internal struggle of wanting to develop and make 
use of the CDSP, but with its troubling past, it has difficulties to ensure an active military 
contribution.  
The identified improvement of operational capacity and resources, EEAS, HR, Crisis 
Platform, Battlegroups and Permanent Structures for Cooperation, were all created in an 
environment that made way for these initiatives. These developments were primarily a 
result of the more EU-positive time from 2003 to 2007, and the high expectations were as 
a result also primarily developed during these years. But the EU had no occasion to 
demonstrate if they could act with unity during these years, and when the occasion came 
the political environment had changed. Especially the UK had become so Eurosceptic, 
that a demonstration of solidarity that could serve as an exhibition of EU's military capa-
bility was unrealistic. It is however understandable that the expectations are high, as Lib-
ya and Mali represent just such crises that the CSDP was meant to react upon. Together 
with the US shifting attitude, it would only seem rational to expect EU to take care of its 
own backyard. But because of the fact, that the MS did not make permanent structures of 
defence or made the CSDP decisions subject to QMV in the years with a positive political 
environment, it has the effect that CSDP decisions are subject to the MS, and especially 
the Big Three’s, shifting attitudes. In this political environment, the expectation of them 
agreeing in a military conflict seemed to have been too high. A solution to this problem 
would have been for the MS to lock in their interests, in the years with an EU positive 
environment, so that a change in the political environment would not impede on the EU’s 
ability to act. Such a lock in could have been in the form of QMV decisions as mentioned 
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above, or by conferring greater powers of autonomy to the institutions, thus insolating 
them from the influence of the interests of the MS, which is subject to changes.  
 
The reality is that the expectations were developed in a time where an united approach, 
with the improvement of operational capacity in hand, might have been feasible to 
expect, but the conflicts emerged during an economic worsening time, at a time where the 
UK has expressed severe doubt about their continued membership and at a time where 
Germany has yet to resolve their internal tensions. With the lack of consensus, the only 
other option would have been to operate within the frame of a “two speed Europe”, with 
the activation of the Permanent Structured Cooperation, and such a defining split seems 
even more unwanted.  
7.2 Have the expectations to the High representative been too high? 
As analysed through analysis (II) (III), there consist a gap between the expectations and 
how the HR actually has performed. In this analysis it is analysed whether the 
expectations to her role has been beyond her actual capabilities, or whether these are 
present, but she lacks the ability to utilize them.  
The starting point will be to look at her defined competences and operational mandate, as 
defined in analysis (I), and then put this into the context of the current political 
environment.  
 
Expectations 
The expectations to the HR comes in two forms, firstly there is the expectations that 
she will represent the EU externally, both as a broker between two hostile parties to 
prevent a crisis to arise, and as a negotiator in bilateral negotiations with other 
countries. The second form she is expected to fulfil is as a mediator between the MS, 
when they negotiate for a common position on foreign policy.  
The role as mediator between the MS in their attempts to agree on a common policy is 
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quite complex. In the Mali case for instance, the MS had already agreed to a strategy for 
the Sahel region, but there was disagreements as to how the goals of the strategy should 
be pursued after Mali started to be destabilized. Some actors expected the HR to put forth 
a strategy, which the MS could compromise on and thus act jointly to solve the crisis. 
This lies within her competences since she can make proposals to the FAC and use her 
agenda setting powers, both on her own and through the EEAS, to pursue such a 
compromise. This however did not happen in the Mali case as have been show in analysis 
(III).  
 
Political context 
As outlined, the expectations to her position and competences was created at a time 
where the political environment was more positive. At that time the Big Three agreed on 
a more united CFSP. Some of the measures that the HR could make use of, to encourage 
a compromise between the Big Three would perhaps have worked in that environment. 
Now however, it is obvious that the Big Three has different agendas, and the expectation 
of the HR being able to make, especially the UK agreeing in joining any kind of military 
operation within EU, seems unrealistic.  
The blame for the failure of this is shared between her and the MS. On one hand it was 
unreasonable to expect her to bridge the gap between the Big Three, who all had different 
opinions on how to handle the crisis, as a result of how the political environment has 
changed to a more conservative one. 
On the other hand, the HR could have played a more active role, and initiate her own 
proposals instead of waiting for the MS to agree. Despite this rather passive role in the 
policy process in the Mali case, the expectations to her have been far too high. In order to 
make them find a compromise, and by doing so fulfilling the expectations, she would 
need to have greater powers and competences vis-a-vis the European Council. 
The HR has subsequently attempted to subdue the high expectations to her position, 
which could be seen as an acknowledgement of the current conservative political 
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environment in the Big Three. 
Her own expectations is thus primarily to act out the decisions reached by the MS. She 
has tried to communicate this interpretation of her role to the other actors in order to 
lower the unrealistic expectations to her role; however this view has not been accepted by 
the actors, wishing for a more assertive HR. 
 
7.3 Part conclusion 
These analyses concludes that the expectation are too high and ought to be lowered. 
As the operational capacity increased, the expectations to the EU’s ability to act as a for-
eign security actor increased as well. This operational development was conditioned on a 
political environment that encouraged cooperation between the Big Three, and when this 
changed, the possibility of activating these new initiatives, did as well. This is a result of 
the intergovernmental nature of EU’s foreign policy, where decisions made are a reflec-
tion of the willingness of the MS. The expectations, that the MS should be able to agree 
on a common approach in an current fast developing crisis, where an military interven-
tion seemed needed, was developed at a time where they might could be satisfied, but 
needed at a time where they definitely could not. It is in this intergovernmental frame-
work and political environment that the HR navigates, with expectations defined at a 
time, where consensus was easier to obtain. As the political willingness changed, without 
securing more autonomy power to the institutions, the expectations remained the same.  
In an intergovernmental system, the political willingness is the determining factor, and as 
these changed over time, it is hard to expect that expectations from a positive time suit a 
more negative one. The expectations are as a result too high, as they did not change ac-
cordingly to the actual political willingness, but remained the same, as a security crisis 
first occurred when the political environment had changed. 
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8. Normative Power discussion 
- Are the expectations gap justifiable when seen in a Normative Power view? 
8.1 From a normative perspective, were the expectations wrong? 
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the subsets found through the analyses in the 
context of the theory ‘Normative Power’ by Ian Manners. This is done to achieve a 
discussion about the premise on which the capability-expectations gap is founded – about 
the necessity of being able to act as a military power.  
  
The capability-expectation gap theory focuses on the differences between what 
expectations, both internal and external, there are to the EU’s foreign policy, which in the 
context of this project focuses on the abilities of the CFSP’s ability to enact a common 
security policy. In contrast ‘Normative Power’ also examines the different ways EU 
enacts its foreign and security policy, but it has a normative foundation. This is not to be 
confused with the concept of normative power, which predisposes that the EU not only 
uses normative power, but that is, what it does best compared to traditional hard and soft 
power. 
 
“My conclusion is that EU is weakest, possibly always will be and perhaps even should 
be in traditional power relations” (Manners lecture part 1, 2013:03.28) 
 
The theory therefore counterbalances the capabilities-expectations gap theory, which is 
used to find the aforementioned gap, but leaves open the question if the expectations are 
the right ones in the first place; meaning whether or not the EU could be more effective in 
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enacting its power through different means, mainly normative power. This contrast is 
discussed in the following sections, both in relation to the findings from the analyses and 
specifically to the crisis in Mali. 
 
8.2 Why the EU should not use hard power 
As previously stated in the section on ‘Normative Power Theory’ this theory argues 
against the use of hard power by the EU, and instead promotes the use of normative 
power to better influence the global community. This however to some degree goes 
against the expectation held by some that EU should be more active in its use of hard 
power, both through direct military interventions and sanctions, like in the previously 
mentioned example of Iran. The position is that the EU in general should act more in the 
vein of other traditional global or regional powers like USA, Russia and China.  
Ian Manners, both, through his ‘Normative Power Theory’ and in the interview conducted 
for this project, argues against the notion that the EU should act in this fashion. The 
argument being that the EU is not a Westphalian state and therefore should not be 
expected to possess the same set of capabilities, and as long as organizations like NATO 
and the UN exist, and the MS have the capability to act by themselves under NATO or 
UN mandate, it would not only be superfluous for the EU to exercise hard power, as a 
primary form of power. It could potentially weaken its use of normative power. As Ian 
Manners explains:  
 
“I’ve never argued that normative power is the opposite of normative power […] but I 
think it’s extremely important (to remember) that hard power can undermine and indeed 
destroy normative power.” (Manners interview, 2013:22.40) 
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The point being that the use of hard power weakens the conversation i.e. normative 
power position because it makes it difficult to negotiate on even terms, when one side 
(the EU) is superior to the other in terms of hard power and could easily get what it wants 
by force. 
Despite this position, the EU has at least on an institutional level through the introduction 
of EEAS and the HR and the concept of EU Battlegroups in the LT been working towards 
having a better capacity for enacting hard power in foreign relations. One could argue 
that this would not hurt its position internationally by replacing its capacity for the use of 
normative power if it was more or less replaced by the use of hard power. The problem is, 
as have been made clear in the analyses, that the EU in its current state is not very 
successful when attempting to employ hard power. For example the EU’s initial response 
to the civil war in Libya, was largely seen as a failure by the international community and 
a lot of the MS. The sanctions against Iran are by some seen as successful but Ian 
Manners disagree. His reasoning being that the EU may have been successful in 
implementing the sanctions, but that they have the wrong effect. The sanctions have 
succeeded in worsening the Iranian economy but this has mostly affected the moderate 
middleclass, and thereby neglecting or weakening the moderate powers in Iran (Manners 
lecture part 2, 2013:25.20), which one would assume was not what the EU was trying to 
accomplish.  
 
8.3 Where the expectations are wrong 
If the EU is to utilize hard power more, it stands to reason that MS and institutions should 
be more in line with each other, and make sure that common goals exists so there is no 
conflicting interests. Common goals for the EU, of course, exist and are even written into 
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the treaties. In fact most of the EU’s normative foundation in foreign relations can be 
found in article 3(5) TEU which states: 
 
“In its relations with the wider world, the Union shall uphold and promote its values and 
interests and contribute to the protection of its citizens. It shall contribute to peace, 
security, the sustainable development of the Earth, solidarity and mutual respect among 
peoples, free and fair trade, eradication of poverty and the protection of human rights, in 
particular the rights of the child, as well as to the strict observance and the development 
of international law, including respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter.” 
 
The problem arises when you consider that there is 28 MS with roughly said 28 different 
viewpoints, who, if the EU is to take action in regards to foreign issues, all need to agree 
on this. 
This dividedness however is one of the things that according to Ian Manners make the 
EU very effective in utilizing normative power. This is because it sends a signal to 
foreign countries. The signal being that 28 countries who has had a long history of 
conflicts now work together (Manners interview, 2013:20.00). 
This dividedness is not preferable though, whenever the EU needs or wants to utilize hard 
power, because of two important factors. First of all there is not always a common goal, 
the same way there is when enacting normative powers. Secondly even if there is a 
common goal, the use of hard power is usually more resource-intensíve because it 
requires the use of military resources.  
This means that the expectation that the EU, in its current state, is able to quickly decide 
to utilize Battlegroups collectively, is somewhat unrealistic in most cases. This was 
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exemplified in the earlier analysis of the Libya crisis and is discussed in the next section 
regarding the crisis in Mali, where it is shown that the MS either failed to decide on a 
common policy or to support what was decided with resources through EU. 
 
8.4 Was the Mali-intervention handled correctly by the EU? 
The situation in Mali goes beyond whether an intervention is right or wrong in a 
‘Normative Power Theory’ context. This is because, as previously established in the 
project, it was a conflict that demanded an immediate response, because of the danger of 
Mali becoming a security threat to the EU and its partners in the region. Therefore the 
response could not exclusively be normative, as a military invention one way or the other, 
was needed. The question is however, if the EU with the experiences learned from similar 
crises, like the one in Libya, handled the situation in Mali correctly? In other words; 
should the EU have activated its Battlegroups and put boots on the ground in Mali, or 
was it a better alternative to allow France, with a UN mandate, to handle the situation 
initially? 
 
As previously established it is very difficult for the MS to agree on a EU lead 
intervention in any case. This assessment together with the fact that an intervention was 
necessary means that a French-lead intervention might have been the best case scenario. 
If France had not presumed responsibility, on a UN-mandate, for the situation, it is 
possible the situation would have deteriorated further. Ian Manners also assesses that it, at 
least in the Mali crisis, is preferable that the intervention is not a EU initiative. Simply 
because France is better suited to resolve the conflict (Manners interview, 2013:15.00). 
It is also important to remember that the EU did play a part in Mali both before and after 
the intervention. First with the Sahel strategy, which is a classic example of the use of 
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normative power, and later with the training of Mali military and general peacekeeping. 
Another way the EU displayed its positive capabilities in Mali, was HR Ashton’s role as 
mediator and peace broker between the conflicting factions. Other actors have seen the 
HR Ashton’s role in Mali as a failure, but through normative power “lenses”, she has 
acted successfully. 
You could thusly argue that it is not necessary for the EU to have a collective military 
strategy for interventions like this one, as long as the alternatives of MS doing it on a UN 
or NATO mandate work. 
 
8.5 What should the EU do? 
It can be derived from the analyses and this discussion that there are two different paths 
the EU cooperation can follow, if EU is to be an important actor in the global community. 
There is the path that at least the institutions seem to want to follow, where the use of 
hard power becomes an increasingly important capability for the Union. For this to 
happen, the EU needs to streamline its decision-making process regarding foreign and 
security policies, and in general it needs to become more like a Westphalian state, in the 
vein of for example USA. In short, this process demands that the capabilities of the EU 
need to be strengthened to live up to the expectations. 
The other path is mostly opposite to the first one, in that the expectations to the EU’s 
foreign and security policy must be lowered to better coincide with the current capacities 
of the EU. This second path is more in line with Ian Manners and his theory on 
‘Normative Power’. This would mean that the EU should mostly enact its powers through 
normative aims as Ian Manners also argues is the most effective way in which the EU 
influences the global community. 
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It seems that with the introduction of EEAS, the HR and a generally more streamlined 
decision-making process, the EU has chosen its path towards being able to use hard 
power to a further degree. This would mean that the lack of coordination and resolutions 
to the aforementioned conflicts, is simply a step on the road towards the end goal. At least 
to the EU institutions, because the MS seem more reluctant to confer their power on 
foreign relations issues. 
This institutional choice has made it hard for the EU to change its path because of the 
institutional concept of path dependency. This means that the EU institutions will likely 
keep working towards being increasingly able to promote its goals through the use of 
hard power, even though it would seem like EU’s use of normative power in the global 
community is more effective and better at promoting EU’s causes, as Ian Manners 
suggests. 
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9 Conclusion 
Does the EU suffer from a capability-expectation gap, and is the contemporary ex-
pectations towards the EU as a global security actor justified? 
The aim of the project was to understand if the EU suffers from a capability-expectation 
gap following the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty, and to what extend the contem-
porary expectations towards the EU as a foreign security actor are justified.  
The EU definitely suffers from a capability-expectation gap. However, it is not the same 
gap, as Hill defined in 1993. Following the implementation of the LT and the changes in 
the institutional framework of CFSP, the EU has managed to increase its operational ca-
pacity and internal resources to a point, where it satisfies the expectations of EU having 
the operational and military capacity of rapidly acting upon a crisis. This development, 
which was a consequence of a positive political environment between the Big Three, sub-
sequently raised the expectations of the EU’s ability to act efficiently. However, no seri-
ous security crisis emerged during these year, and when the crisis of Libya began, the po-
litical environment had changed. When the crisis unfolded, the Big Three were divided, 
and the EU was consequently unable to act in unity. As the expectations had been in-
creased during the years of which the political environment encouraged cooperation be-
tween the Big Three, the disappointment resulting from the division was substantial. The 
disappointment was especially directed at the HR Catherine Ashton; as the HR position 
was created for the purpose of utilizing the EU’s operational capacity by making the MS 
agree. Failing to do so, following a time where such a strong division had not occurred, 
created two clearly defined gaps between the expectations towards the Big Three’s ability 
to agree and the role of HR to make them agree, and their actual capabilities to do so. 
To understand if these gaps were present in a case, where there was no interference from 
NATO or directly from the United States, the Mali crisis was analysed with the focus on 
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the MS and HR’s role. The EU’s role in the Mali crisis, demonstrated again that the EU 
could not live up to their own expectation, of which they even had a concrete strategy on. 
The Mali crisis widened the gap, since the crisis represented the need for a comprehen-
sive approach of military and civilian means, which lies at the core of the CSDP; it is ex-
actly in such a crisis that the Battlegroups and Crisis Platform was supposed to be acti-
vated. But since the MS did not agree to activate this, and the HR did not take the initia-
tive to suggest this, the gaps expanded. However, these two gaps does not seem to be 
closing in the near future, as they are a reflection of a shift in the political environment 
among the Big Three, where the previously EU-positive environment created expecta-
tions that is beyond the contemporary willingness of the current political environment. 
The EU’s ability to act is a direct reflection of the Big Three’s willingness.  
As the Big Three did not “lock in” their preferences of a more autonomous or assertive 
CFSP, in a time where that might have been possible. With these institutional circum-
stances, and with the UK considering their future role in the Union, the expectations of 
the Big Three agreeing, on for instance activating the Battlegroups, a consent which 
would establish the EU as a military actor, seem too high. The expectations to the HR are 
therefore also too high, as the HR does not have a real possibility to unite these countries 
in such matters – which is the main expectation to this position. In addition, this expecta-
tion could also be seen as misguided and therefore unjustified, since the EU has shown to 
apply its influence better, when acting through normative power compared to military 
power.  
Therefore, the EU does suffer from a contemporary capability-expectation gap, as expec-
tations and capabilities were developed at one point, and their use were demanded in an-
other. In an intergovernmental body, political willingness dictates the use of capabilities, 
so when expectation does not lower at the same rate as the MS willingness, the expecta-
tions becomes unjustifiably high. So, to close the gap, these expectations need to be low-
ered, or the political environment needs to change.  
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10 Reflection 
This section aims to expose and locate the possible weaknesses or blind spots of this 
project. This is done to clarify, what this project can be used for scientifically, and to 
show that the project group behind this project have made considerations regarding the 
results and general methodology of this project. This will also be used to strengthen the 
scientific validity of the project. 
The methodological approach of this project has had a great influence on the way the 
problem formulation has been answered. As it is the choice of methodology, the inductive 
approach, focuses on analysing qualitative data, rather than quantitative data. As the 
inductive approach, used in this project, relies on qualitative data and patterns in that data 
to say something in general about the subject. This approach has to some extent made the 
analyses, and thereby the conclusion, based mostly on a normative perspective, since the 
methodology makes concluding anything definitive quite difficult. The conclusion seeks 
to answer the problem formulation in the most adequate way possible, but the subject and 
methodological approach makes it impossible to uncover every little aspect of the 
problem. The problem however does not in itself suggest a definitive descriptive answer, 
so in the context of this project, this does not invalidates the results of the analyses. 
The same could be said for the choice of theories, since there are no definitive criteria for 
answering the problem through them fully, in neither of the theories used in this project. 
This means that this project is normatively based in both its approach to the problem and 
its answer to the same problem. 
Another methodological approach, like the deductive approach, might have given a more 
precise answer to a problem formulation, since this approach goes the opposite way of 
the inductive approach, in that it takes a general theory and applies it to a specific case. 
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This was however not as viable in this project since the purpose was to find the gap 
between the expectation and the capabilities of the EU’s security and defence policy. This 
was a consequence of a conscious choice to base the methodology on the chosen theory 
and not the other way around. 
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11 Call f or future research 
This project analyses and discusses the expectations to EUs foreign and security policies, 
especially with a focus on the role of HR Ashton and the EEAS compared to that of the 
MS. The expectations and capabilities of the EU on foreign matters are analysed to find 
the gap between the expectations and the actual capabilities the EU can utilize in those 
areas. There are several ways to further work with the subject and thereby contribute to 
broadening the understanding of EU’s role as a global actor and the capabilities it uses to 
influence the global community. 
A thing to consider regarding the future of the EU security and defence policy is a 
Council meeting that takes place on the 19-20 December 2013, which is about the future 
development of the EU’s common security and defence policy. The meeting is scheduled 
to include discussions on how to advance the operational capacity, thereby improving the 
way EU responds to crises. Improving the defence capabilities by more systematic and 
longer term cooperation agreements between the countries and lastly expanding the 
European defence industry (EC, 2013). This meeting takes place after the deadline of this 
project but it could be useful to investigate what is decided in future research on the 
subject. 
This Project has also, in the research towards explaining the expectations for EU foreign 
policy, touched upon UK’s role in the Union. It was determined that UK was very 
sceptical and reluctant to commit to, and be part of, a common defence and security 
initiative, and in general did not want there to be a EU alternative to NATO. It would in 
connection with this be interesting to investigate the UK’s future role in the Union, 
especially with the upcoming referendum on EU-membership. What are the 
consequences for the EU if the UK withdraws further from the Union? It is also 
important to take note that Scotland plans its own referendum on Scottish withdrawal 
from the UK if the UK withdraws from EU, because Scotland still wants to be part of the 
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EU. Another interesting question in regards to this is; what would the consequences be 
for UK if it left the Union. 
Likewise Germany’s future and current role concerning the EU’s security policy would 
be interesting to look at, more than it has been done in this project. This is because they 
are one of the countries pushing for further integration on the foreign policy area, but are 
at the same time negative about the prospects of military intervening and the use of 
military assets in a conflict. 
In this project, a lot of security policy cases have been utilized to investigate how the EU 
reacts and what the EU is capable of in those types of situations. These are cases like the 
civil wars in Syria and Libya, the conflict in Mali and the sanctions against Iran. 
The sanctions against Iran were used as a an example of EU’s use of hard power, but 
mostly as a way of analysing the foreign decision-making process in the EU. It would be 
interesting to delve deeper into the sanctions and also investigate their consequences for 
Iran and its people. In the lecture with Ian Manners, used in this project, he mentions that 
the sanctions against Iran does not have the desired effect, because its consequences 
affects the Iranian middleclass, which are largely relatively moderate and progressive 
(Manners lecture, 2013:26.20). It would be beneficial to investigate this to further the 
understanding of the EU’s hard power and its effects. 
In the spring of 2014 there will be held elections for the EP and as HR Ashton’s mandate 
as HR expires, this means that significant changes might happen regarding to the way 
EU’s foreign policy is conducted depending on how the new EP is divided and who 
overtakes the role of HR. As established throughout the project, HR Ashton was criticized 
for her passive role in establishing an agenda for European foreign policy and in many 
regards acted more like a spokesperson. If a more activist HR is chosen, it would be 
interesting to investigate how that changes the role of the HR and EEAS.  
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